

The Breakdown of National Tribes and Pillars: The effects of immigration and integration policy  
implementation on Muslims in Denmark and the Netherlands

By Megan Lahr

**ABSTRACT**

*This paper explores the effects of immigration and integration policies on Muslim immigrants in Denmark and the Netherlands. Changes in the past decade have led to an increase in assimilation and integration-based policies. Public opinion based on the vast influx of Muslim immigrants has resulted in a shift of political power in both Denmark and the Netherlands. A close examination of two policies, one from each country, reveals how current policies are implemented within the specific cultural environments of Denmark and the Netherlands, while paying close attention to the conflicting values between native citizens and Muslim immigrants. The Danish Radicalization Prevention Program and the Rotterdam Code of Conduct portray differing aspects of immigration policy, and offer distinctive outlooks of the goals of each country. The paper also looks into how the contradicting values of Muslims and native European citizens result in ideas of fear as well as a need for more regulation. The ideas of bonding and bridging social capital are used to show how despite differences in values and culture, various groups can be socially cohesive. The concept of deterrence is also explored, looking at it as an effect of current policies on Muslims in both Denmark and the Netherlands.*

Newspaper cartoons and made-for-television documentaries are not usually viewed as highly important, but when they take on an issue dealing with religious tolerance, these simple creative venues generate widespread controversy. The cartoons portraying Muhammad in a Danish paper, and a documentary on Dutch television depicting a woman with passages of the Quran written on her naked body, were highly offensive to many Muslims and other groups across the globe. Communities in both Denmark and the Netherlands were quick to realize that the largest category of immigrants in both countries, believers of the Islamic faith, was not amused by either action. Both incidents are representative of a lack of awareness and a general nonchalance toward immigrant cultural values.

These situations show how the entrenched cultural views of native citizens in both Denmark and the Netherlands are among primary factors at work in how interactions take place between the ethnic Dutch and Danish population and Muslim immigrants. Immigration policy implementation in Denmark and the Netherlands is being affected by public reactions to Muslim immigrants. The goal of this paper is to examine how two different interpretations of immigration policy compare in their effects on Muslim immigrants in the two countries. The Danish "Radicalization Prevention Program" and the Dutch "Rotterdam Code of Conduct" serve as two examples of programs that, through their implementation, affect integration processes of immigrants. The ways in which immigration policy has noticeably changed in Denmark and the Netherlands can be examined through the fascinating and ever-changing implementation of these regulations.

This issue has become extremely salient due to the outcry from Muslim immigrants claiming to be treated unequally through government policy. Greater understanding could lead to better communication between native citizens and Muslim immigrants, creating a better system

for immigrants to become a part of society in their new home. Viewing immigrants as a national problem is a newer phenomenon, and the different ways in which Denmark and the Netherlands handle this dilemma are based on the unique native culture of each country. The viewpoints held by Dutch and Danish legislatures have become increasingly apparent worldwide as the shift from multiculturalism and liberal democratic acceptance has turned into assimilationist and nationalistic policies, leading to discrimination against immigrants, particularly those of Muslim backgrounds. While the Netherlands has recently adopted a more assimilationist standpoint for immigration and rejected its former multiculturalist (pluralistic) view, Denmark has simply gone from being a non-immigration country to one with high priority on integration and assimilation. Through their specific historical situations, the Netherlands and Denmark have created their own national models for immigration and continue to make legislative revisions to their systems.

These two countries hold many similarities, but the distinctions they exhibit in history, policy, and culture make the comparison of these nations a great test case for examining the effects that immigration policies have on Muslim immigrants. Both countries depend largely on a strong state welfare system and are currently experiencing a large influx of immigrants, mainly consisting of individuals with Muslim backgrounds. Arriving at conclusions about the effectiveness of policy implementation will advance awareness of immigration policy effects and unjust discrimination toward Muslim immigrants in contemporary Europe.

## **Methods**

A large compilation of secondary sources analyzing the immigration situation in Denmark and the Netherlands was used to complete this research. Legislation in translation, government websites and governmental program outlines, along with summaries thereof dealing with immigration and integration were also integral in this analysis. Since this combination of

sources has rarely been used before in such a comparison, the importance was in evaluating how the legislation and programs were implemented and, in turn, how the programs deal with the integration of Muslim immigrants. By examining these sources, two specific programs were selected to serve as examples of the interpretation and implementation of immigration and integration policies. A comprehensive description of the Danish "Radicalization Prevention Program" was analyzed as an accurate representation of policy in action. This program was new in 2009 and is a good example of policy that was created as an attempt to combat radicalization through many facets of life in Denmark. For the Netherlands, the "Rotterdam Code of Conduct" was a local initiative aimed at bringing about a collective idea of the expected conduct for the city of Rotterdam. Although the *Code* is not a national policy, it is particularly relevant because it was implemented in Rotterdam, a town with the largest amount of immigrants, in order to bring about social cohesion.

The goals and functions of each program were studied to examine the intention of the program as well as the actual results. Similarities were found in the area of mistreatment of Muslims, although differences in the extent and the underlying reasons varied. Through the analyses of these two policy designs, a detailed and specific perception was garnered in order to assess the effects on Muslim immigrants in Denmark and the Netherlands. The literature and the findings regarding the legislative programs were combined in a way that exhibits a clearer understanding of why Muslim immigrants are being singled out through the implementation of Dutch and Danish policies.

### **Theoretical Overview**

Theoretically, this paper applies the concept of social capital to issues of immigration as presented in Denmark and the Netherlands. Social capital is the idea of network cooperation

based on mutual trust that gives a group the ability to achieve a collective good (Nannestad 2008:608). As the process of immigration leads to the possibility of integration, this idea of mutual trust and group cooperation seems to provide a proper setting for increased understanding and support for newly arrived immigrants. Within the subject of social capital two types have been determined, both of which have different ways of affecting integration. Bridging social capital connects individuals to a broader social structure outside of their normal group capacities, while bonding social capital binds individuals to his or her narrow and established social group (Nannestad 2008:607). With integration, social capital becomes an issue of whether or not immigrants choose to actively seek out individuals to form a broader social network, or if upon arrival immigrants will only associate with other individuals from their same background because it is easy and accessible.

There is a debate about what type of social capital is most important for immigrants in establishing a stronger national environment and situation for immigrants in a new country with different social and cultural understandings. Some suggest that bridging social capital is most important in forming new networks within the native culture in a new environment, while others perceive bonding social capital as extremely important to how immigrants begin adapting to these new constructs. Since the aspect of trust is the underlying factor of both types of social capital, this concept can be applied to immigration and the success of integration particularly within the confines of the struggles existing in Denmark and the Netherlands with the Muslim immigrants.

### **Historical Context in Europe**

Public policy in Europe has changed to include immigration legislation only within the last century, and for the most part within the last 10-50 years. Until recently, immigration was

never seen as a national problem or as a problem at all. Although many countries, including both Denmark and the Netherlands, participated in guest worker schemes in the 1960s and 1970s, these were not initially viewed as a step toward becoming an immigrant-receiving country (Fair 2008; Shadid 2006). As time went on, many of the guest workers chose to remain in their destination and began to bring their families from home. This process continued until countries began to see the constant and rising flow of immigrants as a new problem.

As a result, the general population and political leaders began to take issue with the immigrants coming to live in their country, and there was a perceptible rise in ultra-conservative anti-immigration opinions. In Denmark since 2001, political decision-making in Parliament has been controlled by the right-wing Danish People's Party, while a similar situation occurred in the Netherlands by their conservative factions (Andersen, Larsen, & Møller 2009; Andersen 2007; Fair 2008; Hedetoft 2003; Hegge 2004; Kristensen 2007; Lawler 2007; Omestad 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). With this shift in political power, both countries entered into a new era of more conservative viewpoints resulting in strong immigration reform.

Beyond the idea of immigration, integration is a relatively new legislative concern among European countries. Some immigrants have chosen to live in isolated immigrant communities resulting from multiculturalist policies, causing countries like Denmark and the Netherlands to change perspectives and take this into account in their policy outlook. In 1999, Denmark was the first country to establish actual integration legislation ("A comprehensive" 2006), and though today not all European countries have such concrete examples, there are ad hoc policies that spell out how integration should be encouraged.

Mass Muslim immigration in Europe is a recent occurrence and one that is being dealt with on more of a political level than the immigration of other categories of people. Leaders in

many countries are pointing to what they describe as essential differences in European standards when compared to the values and norms of Muslim immigrants that are undemocratic and in some cases against basic human rights (Andersen 2007; Hedetoft 2003; Jackson and Parkes 2007; Kramer 2006; Lawler 2007; Morawska 2008; Stokes 2005). The immigrants discussed throughout this paper vary in their grounds for being able to enter either Denmark or the Netherlands. Both countries are technically closed to normal immigration, though despite this one must acknowledge all of the exceptions.

There are the common exceptions regarding employment and education that are not addressed in this paper, along with immigrants who do not normally qualify for approved immigration. Family reunification is a large category of immigrants arriving in Europe today, along with many asylum seekers and refugees. Family reunification laws vary in each country, and despite the typical willingness of a country to allow reunification, regulations are becoming stricter due to the large influx that continues unabated. Though refugees are not assessed through this study, asylum seekers are the other most common example of immigrants entering Europe. Some asylum seekers arrive and are in genuine danger in their home country, therefore legitimating their asylum claim, whereas others are not actually in danger and have been known to fabricate stories in order to remain or even just apply in the new country (Buruma 2006). These issues of arrival and grounds for immigration are less important than the effects of integration programs, yet nonetheless important to acknowledge the way in which immigrants are arriving in Europe.

### **Policy Implementation Overview of Denmark and the Netherlands**

Changes in immigration policy have occurred that, whether through intent or by chance, ultimately affect Muslim immigrants to a greater degree than other immigrants. A major portion

of this argument may be that Muslim immigrants are simply arriving in Europe in much greater numbers, so it is not by chance that more Muslims feel targeted. Beyond this change in reality, the change in public opinion to greater anti-Muslim sentiment is widely apparent. There is a sense of fear and mistrust that mutually exists between Muslim immigrants and native Europeans. This mistrust leaves many ethnic Europeans feeling as if there is a greater chance of violence associated with this immigration influx that could in turn lead to the loss of highly regarded democratic values. Due to various events in the past decade within Denmark and the Netherlands, these sentiments are experienced and expressed in different ways.

### **Denmark**

One of the most important differences between Denmark and the Netherlands is the way in which each country and its citizens see themselves. Native Danish citizens - all five and a half million of them - are quite homogeneous in almost every way, and they even go so far as to consider themselves a tribe. This close-knit attitude combined with the economic concerns of preserving their precious welfare state brings about at least a small amount of hostility to anyone believed to be disrupting this way of life (Fair2008; Hedetoft2003; Kristensen2007; Lawler2007; Omestad 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). During the 1990s in Denmark, immigrants from non-western countries and their descendents were net beneficiaries of the welfare state while native Danes were net contributors (Nannestad 2004:762). This statistic serves to illustrate how many immigrants are able to benefit from a system in which they have made no contribution. Animosity felt by those paying into the system is easily understood, as is the potential threat to the structure if such a cycle would continue. This hostility has resulted in the increase of attention paid to immigrants and has had a visible impact in the emergence of more immigration policy. Much of the Nordic welfare model is based on mutual trust (Forsander 2004:209). This

model of trust and the present lack of this value between native Danes and immigrants is where the disparity most often arises and from where the majority of problems stem.

Barely half of the immigrants currently in Denmark work, a shocking fact that has many contributing factors (Omestad 2007:42). There is widespread discrimination against immigrants based on outwardly obvious factors such as skin color and language or accents. Opportunities for jobs are simply not as available to immigrants because they are not instantly aware of how the Danish system works. To immigrants trying to enter the labor market, the tight social networks that are so characteristic of the Danish society tend to exclude immigrants, or at least hamper their labor market integration (Forsander 2004:215). While this is true, the biggest issues for immigrants in attempting to find a job are language barriers and the lack of acculturation.

With this strong belief in cohesiveness of their group, Danes seem to resist and dislike change. Studies have found a strong emphasis on immigrants becoming "Danish" culturally, and that when this does not occur there is a strong sense of alienation between the ethnic Danes and the immigrant groups (Hedetoft 2003; Kristensen 2007; Omestad 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). In dealing with immigrant groups, Danes almost universally have the outlook that their first order of business is protection, again referring to the tribe concept. Overall, the Danes have continued to prefer a national approach to immigration-related decisions, both in Denmark and within European Union debates (Messina 2007:165). What seems to be an instinctive response among the Danes can be viewed as highly exclusive from the immigrants, particularly the Muslim immigrants who are most affected.

Danish immigration policy has undergone great change since 2001, not only because of the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in the United States, but also due to the change in government leadership in the Danish parliament, resulting in more restrictive laws (Andersen,

Larsen and Møller 2009; Andersen 2007; Fair 2008; Hedetoft 2003; Hegge 2004; Kristensen 2007; Lawler 2007; Omestad 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen2003). As can be viewed in the chart (see Appendix), Denmark has rapidly initiated policies that affect all immigrants and mandate at least a certain amount of collaboration. The Danish government is involved with immigrants for at least the first three years of their residence in Denmark. Once accepted as an immigrant, individuals are assigned to a particular city and given housing. Each immigrant is required to complete a three-year program consisting of language training, social and civic training, and possible job training (Lawler 2007:115). Stipends are given to individuals and families who are unable to provide for themselves, health care is covered by the national welfare state, and job counseling and training are both available in order to integrate immigrants into the workplace (Andersen 2007:259). After eight years, immigrants are allowed to apply for permanent residency and citizenship, and it is at this time that they are required to take language and cultural exams (Lawler 2007:116).

Although the program to integrate and possibly nationalize immigrants in Denmark takes many years, the purpose of the program is to act as a form of integration protocol that helps immigrants adapt to Danish society as quickly and thoroughly as possible. Despite the fact that the policies call for cooperation among native citizens and immigrants, in reality this does not normally occur. Denmark's policy renovation was prompted by government turnover based on public reactions that sparked nationalistic sentiment in favor of retaining tribal unity, but in the Netherlands the violent reactions were closer to home, so the threats may have seemed more real.

### **The Netherlands**

The Netherlands has for centuries been known as a country that is very accepting of different ethnic and religious groups, and subscribed to the idea of multiculturalism long before

the term even existed (Coenders et al. 2008; Kramer 2006; Leiken 2005; Morawska 2008). For many years, Jews, Catholics, Protestants and other groups lived together in harmony in the Netherlands. Though they had little social interaction, these groups were able to maintain nearly absolute peace. Formed in the 17<sup>th</sup> century as a way for Protestants and Catholics to live *separately* together, the four "pillars" were formed by the Protestants, Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals to protect and promote group expression of convictions (Kramer 2006; Monsma & Soper 1997:61). Through the process of pillarization, the Dutch created various segments of society that were self-segregating and allowed the people as a whole to be fully functioning without interaction or disagreement. Pillarization formed on the basis of religion or ideology, and emerged as a result of political mobilization and ideas of non-interference (van der Veer 2006:533). This idea stuck through the centuries and eventually adapted into what the Netherlands considered to be their original immigration policy of multiculturalism.

Many scholars of European immigration have commented on the influx of Muslim immigrants as a "fifth pillar" to the already established pillars in the Netherlands, positing that they are one group that does not peaceably fit in (Bail 2008; Coenders et al. 2008; Jackson and Parkes 2007; Kramer 2006; Rex 1994; Shadid 2006). Though it is no longer in use, the pillar system allowed groups to maintain their own communities while leaving the few remaining public interactions completely secular. Perception of Muslim immigrants has been negative due to the fact that many natives believe that the principles of Islam are incompatible with the democratic Dutch values (Jackson and Parkes 2007; Kramer 2006; Morawska 2008; Stokes 2005). Remaining devoted to their own values often leads Muslims to a sort of self-selection in their association with others. While some Muslims try to re-pillarize themselves against the native Dutch citizens, the policies in the Netherlands have come to force more integration and do

not allow for the exclusiveness of pillars to develop yet again. A direct result of this is that there is not an allowance by the Dutch government for bonding social capital to exist to the same extent since they are putting an immense stress on the necessity of immediate bridging. Recent changes in Dutch policy may be more of a reaction to apparent threats by Muslim immigrants and citizens.

The Netherlands has faced much violence and distress associated with the influx of Muslims. The murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh in 2002 and 2004, respectively, are thought by many to be major causes of anti-Muslim sentiment amongst Dutch nationals (Bail 2008; Coenders et al. 2008; Jackson and Parkes 2007; Kramer 2006; Leiken 2005; Morawska 2008; Stokes 2005). Fortuyn, a politician and anti-immigration proponent, and Van Gogh, an outspoken filmmaker and author, were killed in response to their various viewpoints and actions related to their opposition to Muslim immigration in the Netherlands. The reality of violence in the Netherlands has further elevated the perceived need for stricter legislation to prevent the polarization of groups. Many point to Muslim extremists as being at fault for the change in tone among Dutch citizens, but in reality it may just be personal sentiments of xenophobia or mistrust.

This sense of mistrust is exacerbated by the fact that the Netherlands feels pressure to close the doors to the Dutch welfare state and maintain tighter boundaries around the community of legitimate receivers and beneficiaries (Geddes 2003:124). Immigrants are largely charged with taking more out of the system than they put in, and this pretense is disliked by many native Dutch who believe immigrants are choosing the Netherlands *because* they will receive such great benefits. As a result, there have been policies developed to help immigrants integrate into the private and public sectors of the labor market (Crul & Vermeulen 2006:240). The target of this process would be to employ, and therefore integrate, more of the immigrants to develop both a

greater economic independence for themselves as well as a sense of what the labor market has to do with the overall Dutch culture.

These active policies for enhancing labor market positions are further combined with measures like language courses, basic education, and vocational training to improve the well-being of the immigrants (Castles & Miller 2003:225). The chart (see Appendix) allows for easy comparisons between Danish and Dutch immigration policies. The Dutch have recently moved to a system that requires more from immigrants *prior* to their arrival in the Netherlands. This move has served to prevent much immigration for a variety of reasons. There is now a film that is used to inform possible immigrants of what the country is like, and serves as a tool to combat intolerance harbored by many Muslim immigrants. The film shows and describes nudity, homosexuality, cold weather, expensive housing, flood-prone conditions, as well as an explanation that honor killing, wife beating and female circumcision are all illegal practices in the Netherlands (Hundley 2009). The film must be used to prepare for the culture exam, and there is also a language exam that must be passed before immigration status is accepted. These exams are offered at Dutch embassies; with the preparation material and DVD available in 14 languages costing \$80, and the tests \$425, the price may be more than some possible immigrants can afford (Hundley 2009). In addition to these exams, there is a requirement of proper housing and financial support for family reunifications (Andersen 2007:258). Health services are provided upon arrival in the Netherlands, along with job training and placement services.

The barriers to acquiring legal immigration status and a residency permit for the Netherlands have become quite a challenge, particularly to those who do not have enough money. The new policy went into effect in March of 2006, and at this time the rate for

unemployment among immigrants was at 12.2%; over 8.5% higher than that of Dutch nationals (Casciani 2008). Problems such as this were sources in the formation of more stringent immigration policies that aimed to improve quality of life throughout the country. The target result was a policy that would act as a filter to allow for fewer overall immigrants, and even fewer immigrants who were unwilling to change and adapt to the realized and liberal Dutch values. If this goal were to be met, there might be less of a need for increased in-country assimilation regulations because the influx of unwanted immigrants may decrease.

With the shift from multiculturalism to assimilationism in the Netherlands, the total outlook of the public and the political leaders has shifted. The Dutch are currently pursuing strategies that shift the burden of incorporation away from the state and government institutions onto the immigrants themselves (Messina 2007:243). Viewed through particular policies and programs, these initiatives place more responsibility on the immigrants to become "Dutch" in both a cultural and economic sense of the word.

### **Program Analyses**

Through research on the immigration and integration policies of the Netherlands and Denmark, it becomes clearer that the problem may not be in the text or formation of such legislation, but rather in the implementation of the programs created. There is a question of who is to blame for the ill effects felt by Muslim immigrants, and perhaps that cannot be pinpointed. The Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration in Denmark and the Immigration and Nationalization Services in the Netherlands are bodies in charge of oversight of how policies are carried out through the creation and maintenance of integration programs. By examining programs in detail, one can begin to see the effects of immigration policies and determine why

they are disproportionately affecting Muslims and what can be done to improve existing situations.

### **Denmark: Radicalization Prevention Program**

Currently, 48% of Danes think that Muslims in Denmark are a threat to Danish culture and religion (Klausen 2005:124). This perceived threat can easily show through in policies that are created in a way to restrain Muslims and other immigrants. The public reactions to Muslims and their different cultural values have become a greater issue within the politics and popular discourse surrounding immigration. Another idea being formed is that the prospect of Islamic fundamentalism continues to stress the unassimilability of immigrants, leading to further increases in ways to control immigrants (Brubaker 1992:76). Through the implementation of the Danish “Radicalization Prevention Program” native Danes are attempting to prevent Islamic extremists from inhibiting the democratic, national culture that is predominant throughout their country’s history.

This program was formed in response to the observation that there is an increasing trend toward radicalization in recent years, which led to a meeting of Danish government officials to discuss ideas of radicalization prevention in 2008 (“Prevention” 2009:6). The program’s action plan describes the many initiatives that will target the formation of extremism in several forms. While the action plan outlines extremism as totalitarian, anti-democratic ideologies held by any group (including left and right wing groups), the majority of the description addresses the main issue of Muslim extremism in Denmark (“Prevention” 2009). Through the use of youth interventions, mentoring, sports camps and increased pressure on parental responsibility, the program seeks to prevent youths from becoming involved in extremist organizations (“Prevention” 2009:12, 14). By targeting young adults, the government is attempting to prevent

even the earliest exposure to extremism, thus eliminating large groups or gangs of radicals in the future.

One specific initiative seeks a partnership with the Muslim community in Denmark that specifically asks for assistance from within their group. The government proposed that Muslims should be assisted in forming a code of conduct that would ensure that extremist forces do not use mosques or Islamic cultural centers as a platform for spreading undemocratic views or for recruiting members ("Prevention" 2009:25). Together, the Danish government believes that the issue of radicalization can be addressed from the bottom level before it escalates to become a greater social problem. This particular portion of the program has the possibility to create an open dialogue between the government and Muslim leaders, although if implemented in a top-down fashion, it may seem that the government is enforcing its will upon the Muslim community; a gesture that would not be received well by anyone in that position. A threat posed to this proposal is the existence of vulnerable, isolated residential areas of immigrants throughout the country that minimize social cohesion and integration through ghettoization ("Prevention" 2009:21). Government funding and other anti-discrimination measures can improve this dilemma of lacking social capital to allow for more interaction and bridging between native Danes and immigrants to increase the level of mutual understanding of cultural values.

By strengthening democracy and civil citizenship in schools for youth, and at adult levels in immigration programs, democratic cohesion will arise and lead to less radicalization, specifically within the Muslim population ("Prevention" 2009:19). The necessity of these values held by native Danes is of the utmost importance, and the public holds a strong belief in the idea that with submersion into a democratic way of thinking the immigrants will be less extreme or conservative in their thoughts, and therefore their actions. Danish officials have also proposed a

program to train foreign religious preachers about the democratic values in Denmark ("Prevention" 2009:19), addressing a similar issue of introducing the same democratic ideals into the most fundamental audience.

Although this program resides within the jurisdiction of the newly created Division for Cohesion and Prevention of Radicalization under the Ministry of Integration, collaborative efforts combined input from the public and the Ministries of Justice, Education, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Social Welfare, and Culture ("Prevention" 2009:26). The united efforts of these ministries led to a policy that covered many realms of society, including everything from educational changes to policing practices. This program was created as a long-term endeavor to ensure that Denmark is a country characterized by safety, cohesion and room for diversity, based on cooperation between individuals who have personal responsibility for positively contributing to the society ("Prevention" 2009:30). By putting immigrants and native citizens together to collaborate with these efforts, the Danish government is working to bring about greater bridging between both parties.

Radicalization, defined as the process where a person gradually adapts ideas and methods of extremism, is viewed as a problem with Islamic extremists who are seen by the Danes as being opposed to democratic legal order and attempting to influence other Muslims to oppose democracy and avoid involvement in society ("Prevention" 2009:8-9). The Danish government is seeking to exert energy in the prevention of radicalization because they realize there is little to be done with current radicals, at least until they act out. Though the goals of this program are set rather high, there remains the notion that the fear of radicalization must not become a source of exclusion ("Prevention" 2009:29). It is understood that through this program the Danes would like to prevent future radicalization that would negatively affect the entire society, but at the

same time they recognize that if taken to the extreme, this program could cause more harm. The fine line between imposing beliefs and preventing radicalization in others is important to recognize, though with basic implementation of this program the Danes will remain on-track for their goals based on their ideals.

### **How and Why the Program Came About**

The process by which this program came about was the result of many years of political and cultural change in Denmark, combined with strong reactions by the Danish people to these changes. Over 85% of Danish natives think that people belonging to minority groups must give up those parts of religion and culture that conflict with national law (Geddes 2003:113). This statistic, which was the highest of all European Union nations, displays the general feelings of Danes considering the necessity to abide by laws regardless of personally held beliefs. There is great concern with what would happen if immigrants, particularly Muslims, would continue to arrive in Denmark and *not* follow Danish laws, but solely rely on personal beliefs as a moral compass. Danes believe that efforts to combat the forces of radicalization should continue as to prevent Muslim extremists from undermining cohesion, security, and mutual trust in a society where these values are highly revered ("Prevention" 2009:4).

Reasons for such sentiments have fluctuated over time, and there are many explanations for why Danes have such strong views against strict or extreme Muslim values. Some think that Danes are so intolerant of Muslim immigrants because the Danes themselves have lost their spirituality (Klausen 2005:15). As a country that continues to have a National Church, while allowing for freedom of religion, this claim may seem rather absurd. Despite the existence of the Lutheran-based Danish National Church, Danes are among the least religious national populations in Europe (Lawler 2007:108). The intense differences between levels of religiosity

among the majority of Muslims and the majority of ethnic Danes may be what causes such intense reactions to Muslim extremism.

The aforementioned cartoon crisis in Denmark that depicted Mohammed in various forms caused uproar against Danes and the West for being too secular (Kramer 2006). At the same time Danes see the Muslims immigrating to their country as too religious, to a point where it conflicts with Danish democracy. The Radicalization Prevention Program is a way for Danes to diminish the incidence of extremism in Denmark, therefore further protecting their common, more secular ideals.

Another reason that this program has come to fruition is due to the fear of conspiracies against the Danes, most often in the form of propaganda against Denmark. Because of this feeling, Denmark has taken more of a defensive position, resulting in the use of their own propaganda to advance their positions. This fear felt by some Danes may be a result of propaganda in a different form. Politicians trying to create their own agenda may be behind the tactics to elicit a reaction from the general public. A member of the Danish People's Party (a party known for its conservative, anti-immigration position) has claimed that the aim of immigrated Muslims is to convert the Danish nation to Islam (Hegge 2004:49). Though this presumption may be believed by some, many Danes are not as easily influenced. That being said, comments and views like this do affect how Danes view immigrants when these viewpoints are continually expressed.

The program describes Denmark as an accommodating and safe society that holds democracy, intellectual freedom, freedom of expression and religion, and equal rights for all as ground rules for their country ("Prevention" 2009:4). This description is relatively accurate since the Danish population does hold these values as the basis of their laws, and therefore maintains

the utmost importance of such values in Danish society. The accuracy in portrayal of Danes may waver where the action plan states that Denmark is internationally “considered by many as a model to follow” (“Prevention” 2009:4). This assertion twists the language into the form of propaganda, which is used to depict Denmark as an accepting place with exemplary laws and programs for dealing with immigration issues. Though parts of Denmark and Danish policies (like the universal welfare state) may be models to follow, policies dealing with immigration are generally not seen as such.

The reason for the creation of such propaganda stems from the “myths and misinformation” that the draft claims to have been occurring throughout the world, leaving many with a distorted perception of Denmark (“Prevention” 2009:4). To salvage images of Denmark, programs like this will contain components focused on truthful, yet positive information in an attempt to change negative opinions. Militant and radical Islamists are blamed for creating this negative image of Denmark as a country hostile towards Muslims or one that is waging war against Islam (“Prevention” 2009:9). Despite some strict immigration policies, Denmark has shown little outward hostility toward Muslims. In a situation, like the cartoon crisis, where Muslim beliefs have been offended, the Danes maintain their strong, foremost beliefs in democracy and the rights to free expression. Responses from the Danes have been to propose the increase in dialogue and information flow to Muslims, in and out of Denmark, representing Denmark as an accepting place. To counter this propaganda in the Muslim world, this program aims to communicate better with at risk youths as well as Muslims in the international community to challenge these one-sided, negative images of Danes (“Prevention” 2009:16).

## **Implications of the Program for Muslims**

The harsh tone of this program may be in response to what could happen if radicalization was allowed to continue to grow in Denmark. Without this program, extremists would not be prevented or discouraged from continuing their work. Although the aims of the initiative are not directly targeting current extremists, they are intended to curb the existence and formation of extremist groups. As one scholar notes, the more we give in to the radicalization of Islam, the more they will harden their tone (Bruckner 2007). This idea of not condoning the actions of extremists or giving in to them is a strong force in Denmark.

In opposition to this viewpoint, there is the idea that there should be room in a democracy for groups to disagree and think differently than the majority, and that this tenet extends to beliefs that might be viewed by some as "extreme." The government maintains that this is a right given to the people, but that these convictions must be expressed in a legal and peaceful manner, staying within the boundaries of the law ("Prevention" 2009:29). Danes highly value the concept of consensus, and they are quick to qualify any statements of respect for free expression with their preference for cohesion. The action plan stresses that there is every reason for a government or society to want security, so the citizens should speak out against those who call for division, hatred or the abolishment of their democratic system ("Prevention" 2009:29). There seems to be a definite preference for the regulation of extremist viewpoints, but this program is aimed at the prevention rather than the enforcement of radicals. By doing this, the Danish government gives itself the power to express their viewpoints, while allowing for the legal necessities of guaranteed rights to all people present within their constitution and accepted values. This program effectively sets up the boundaries and arrangements to enter the Muslim communities in order to bring about the prevention of further radical beliefs in Denmark.

## **Policy Outlook and Current Policies**

Contradictions within Danish immigration policy are common and incredibly apparent. There are conflicting views that create a tentative response to the struggles associated with the influx of immigrants of different religious backgrounds. Denmark leads in donating financial assistance to developing countries, yet they have the most restrictive immigration policies (Lawler 2007:113). This paradox illustrates clearly how the Danes believe in assistance towards people of other countries and religions, but when the problems and immigrants arrive on their doorstep there is a different response. The almost immediate reaction is that everything is fine until there is a breach of the tribal atmosphere that leads to a possible breakdown of Danishness. It is not so much a question of respect for other cultures or a belief of superiority of the Danish culture above all else, but instead it is simply the strong preference for keeping the values and cultural aspects of Denmark the same as they have historically been maintained.

Danish policies encourage immigrants to gain employment and they do so by making the welfare stipends less than minimum wage, thus creating an incentive for immigrants to find a job (Andersen, Larsen & Møller 2009). This is an effective way for the government to merely encourage integration of immigrants into the workplace, especially since it does not completely take away needed welfare money from those who cannot work. Overall, it simply makes it more difficult for immigrants to remain introverted and refuse to work.

Information on Danish immigration policies and other relevant data about Denmark are fully available in both Danish and English, with the option for 16 other languages, on the immigration website. A variety of subjects including links to legislation (in English and Danish), immigration statistics, and essentials for new immigrants are also online in an easy to maneuver format ("New to Denmark" 2009). Policies in Denmark reflect the issue of contradiction again,

since the information is so readily available via websites, but in reality the restrictions placed on immigrants are quite strict, and in particular seem to affect Muslims in negative ways.

Danish policies are restrictive and targeted. Immigrants are placed in a city of the government's choice, whether or not it is close to family and friends that the immigrants may wish to be near. This distribution is to ensure that immigrant ghettos are not enlarged, thus preventing further bonding social capital. Most of the ghettos are composed of Muslim immigrants and other ethnic minority groups, due to the actuality that more immigrants arriving under family reunification and asylum are among these groups.

On a religious level, immigrants of any religion other than the Danish National Church are forced to abide by the religious customs, now made part of national policies, which may run contrary to the beliefs of many individuals. All babies must register through the Danish National Church in order to receive the mandatory birth certificate, and must also have the child's name approved by the same governing body ("Family" 2009). The 24-year rule and the Condition of Ties are two other policies that have been viewed as controversial in their implementation. The Condition of Ties mandates that the aggregate connection to Denmark must be greater than any other country in order for a couple to reunite in Denmark and gain citizenship, while the 24-year rule asserts that all spouses coming to Denmark must be at least 24-years old ("UNHCR" 2006). DNA tests can be required of individuals to prove they are relatives or that they are *not* relatives (for marriages) ("Aliens Act" 2008), and these laws serve as protections against forced marriages, a principle of some Muslim communities. The combination of accommodations for the language barriers present with immigrants, and the strict realities of specifications for immigration and integration again portray the contradictions in Danish immigration policy, exemplified in the Radicalization Prevention Program as well. The contradictions may continue

to be present within Danish policy, but a result of decreasing radicalization may be a first step in developing greater respect for Muslims and Danes alike.

### **Danish Social Capital**

Danes themselves depend *highly* on bonding social capital which can be seen through their cultural focus on their tribal, close-knit nature. In turn, their policies are aimed at bridging the gap between immigrants and native citizens so that after this step of integration toward more "Danish" ideals, immigrants can bond better with the rest of the Danes. The government seeks to employ the use of bridging social capital so that everyone living in Denmark can eventually bond together as they have always done. The Danish Radicalization Prevention Program is more restrictive than policies in other countries in that it denounces certain views as "radical" while actively discouraging and prohibiting this in Denmark. Instead of a conversation or cooperative assessment about viewpoints, the government chose to make the decisions on their own about what can be tolerated and what should be considered "radical". Bonding, for natives in Danish society, is a strong component of everyday life, and this is an important value that could be shared with immigrants from all backgrounds to establish better relationships as a platform for increased social cohesion.

### **The Netherlands: Rotterdam Code of Conduct**

The rising sentiments against Islam in the long-tolerant Netherlands, where Muslims are now more than six percent of the population, suggests that security concerns involving only a small fraction of immigrants can alter the entire immigration atmosphere (Parsons & Smeeding 2006:8). In the city of Rotterdam specifically, there has historically been a multicultural attitude and way of living, though the influx of immigrants has added the national ideal of assimilation policies to this attitude. There is a conflict in these ideas, and while Rotterdammers work to

maintain a certain amount of multicultural living, more and more believe that immigrants cannot be seen as citizens unless they actively participate in society (van de Vijver et al. 2007:101). This issue has led to what may appear to be compromises within local creation and implementation of laws, including Rotterdam's own "Code of Conduct". Below is the text of the *Code*:

*We the citizens of Rotterdam...*

1. *Assume responsibility for our city and for each other and do not discriminate*
2. *Use Dutch as our common language*
3. *Do not accept radicalization and extremism*
4. *Raise our children to be full citizens*
5. *Treat women equally to men and with respect*
6. *Treat homosexuals equally to heterosexuals and with respect*
7. *Treat people of (different) religious conviction and people without conviction equally and with respect*

The city of Rotterdam is composed of over 150 different nationalities (Van Houdt 2008:5), making 40% of the city's population foreign born citizens with projections that non-natives will be in the majority by 2017 (Hundley 2009). Reactions to these realizations were strong in Rotterdam, as in the rest of the country, and may have resulted in changes of attitude among citizens. Due to the demographic changes, native Dutch citizens may have become afraid that the culture and way of living they had always known would be changed into one they could no longer recognize. In 2005 the city held "Islam and Integration Debates" to openly discuss issues of immigration and cultural changes in their community which resulted in the *Rotterdam Citizen's Code* that was created the next year (Van Houdt 2008:5). Through the creation of this *Code*, goals were set for the entire community of native citizens and immigrants alike, to establish a society that would be accepting and standardized.

An overall goal for the *Code* was to promote "good" and "active" citizenship so that the rules could serve as a solution for the problems of social cohesion and social integration (Van Houdt 2008:5). As major principles, the *Code* calls for speaking Dutch in public, as well as

respect for women, religion, and homosexuals, while condemning discrimination and extremism. Through these terms and tenets of the Code, the city council of Rotterdam made a strong impression favoring respect and the ability for social capital to proliferate. The *Code* explains to immigrants what is acceptable and normal behavior in the Netherlands, a piece that has been missing for years as immigrant-receiving countries have tried only passively to make known native values (Potts 2006). Through the implementation of this *Code*, there has been some criticism about the intentions. Although there is an overt attempt to maintain equality in the city of Rotterdam, it may go beyond this precept to arrive at realities of inequality affecting the Muslim immigrants. The *Code* infers that in a real Dutch culture, the citizens speak Dutch and take responsibility for society, while those who do not actively take part in society or who do speak a foreign language are not accepted (Van Houdt 2008:5-6).

The acceptance of this *Code* was not universal, even among native Dutch citizens. Civil servants and advisors were less enthusiastic than the average citizen, while the overall population consisted of 49% in support of the *Code* and 47% opposed (“Rotterdamers” 2006). It is interesting then to investigate why the *Code* actually came into existence. Strong opinions on both sides of the issue resulted in a *Code* that is not necessarily explicitly restrictive to immigrants, though the overall aim seems to be to discourage Muslims and those with other cultural beliefs. Some critics were quick to assert that the ideas like respect for homosexuals and the rejection of extremism are simply masks added to an essentially racist and discriminatory creed (Potts 2006). In response, the *Code* seems to press for assimilation, while leaving open the possibility of the multicultural attitude that has been important in Rotterdam for centuries.

## The Perceived Need for a Code

This idea of protecting minorities in the Netherlands has become increasingly strong since the devastation of the Jewish minority during World War II. In dealing with the growing population of immigrants, many of which are Muslims, the Dutch begin to see warning signs of what occurred years ago and therefore want to prevent any type of repetition. As has been claimed, the Dutch have a habit of filtering the present through guilty memories of what happened in the *jodenhoek* [Jewish tragedy] (Buruma 2006:240). The idea that the Dutch betrayed the Jews during the Holocaust resonates with shame and guilt in present generations even though they had no direct involvement. The solution that Dutch citizens in Rotterdam have arrived at has been to continue to protect these religious minority immigrants, but at the same time to assure their welfare by pressuring them to assimilate socially.

That the Dutch must never again betray a religious minority (Buruma 2006:51) reinforces the protection of religion within the Netherlands while allowing for the flexibility to create guidelines for immigrants. The most important aspect of the *Code* that must be understood is that it is not legally enforceable; there are no consequences for anyone who should choose to disobey the outlined rules. The only exceptions would be if someone chose to commit a legally prohibited act that was a form of disrespect to women, homosexuals or the other recommendations, which would then be able to be legally prosecuted under normal Dutch laws. Given this discrepancy in legal issues, the latitude given to religious Muslims and other groups remains without the Dutch having to fear the repetition of history.

While there is a sense of being afraid to betray the Muslims in the Netherlands, there is also a level of fear present within the native population. Due to the predictions that the largest Dutch cities will have Muslim majorities within ten years (Cornelius & Tsuda 2004:30), there is

a fear that Muslims will impose their majority will over the entire country (Cohen 2006:550). This threat of control is not the only concern of native citizens. As previously mentioned, Theo van Gogh was murdered as a result of his anti-immigration beliefs and the way he chose to portray those publicly. Theo's murder sparked 106 reported violent anti-Muslim incidents, involving destruction of schools and mosques, and 34 reported incidents against the Dutch, mainly to churches (Jackson & Parkes 2007:34). This massive incidence of violence is an anxiety for the entire Dutch society, but mainly to the conventionally passive Dutch natives.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the woman who worked with van Gogh to create the film that was negatively received by many Muslims, was a Muslim herself who claimed that Islam is a threat to the Western world (Buruma 2006:5). Though her beliefs are based upon the threat that Islam has culturally, with special attention directed to the treatment of women, many others perceive a threat to national security created by the violence used by extremists or conservatives with values against homosexuality or other personal beliefs. To illustrate the continuing, yet unacknowledged problem of honor killings in the Netherlands, Hirsi Ali conducted an investigation while she was a Member of Parliament. Examining only *two* of the 25 police regions in the Netherlands, it was found that 11 girls were killed by their families as honor killings between October 2004 and May 2005 (Hirsi Ali 2007:309). Issues like this that are directly related to Muslim immigrants and their reluctance or outright disobedience to Dutch laws can be viewed as the most important examples of why greater integration and assimilation processes are necessary. The *Code* serves as a way to express the unacceptability of ideas of extremism that often result in violence and lead to more violence from the Dutch as a defensive response.

Perhaps the most far-reaching reason for a strong reaction to Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands is because of the historical importance of many social issues to the Dutch citizens. The Dutch feel like they have just recently freed themselves from Christian conservatism, only to be confronted by Islamic injunctions against the same issues (van der Veer 2006:535). Topics of women's rights, homosexuality, and nudity are viewed quite liberally by Dutch natives, which come into strong opposition with Muslims' conservative viewpoints of these issues. These "new" liberal rights that the Netherlands has come to be known for in contemporary times are strongly defended by most Dutch citizens.

Pim Fortuyn, who happened to be a homosexual, vehemently called the ways of Islam "backward" and often commented that the Netherlands was "full", with no room for immigrants (Geddes 2003:118). The party that Fortuyn created was deeply entrenched in values of a free, modern society whose ideas greatly clashed with many beliefs of the Islamic faith. Fortuyn's party was strengthened when anti-Islamic beliefs were reinforced in the aftermath of 9/11 (Laurence & Vaisse 2006:264). His commitment to Dutch values was strong and helped Fortuyn to gain a large following that remained even after his death. In a recent survey of the Dutch population, Fortuyn was selected as the greatest figure in Dutch history, surpassing Anne Frank to claim the victory (Buruma 2006:45). This popularity surpassed political affiliation to arrive at the essentials of Dutch life that Fortuyn so aptly portrayed. The notion of protecting newly claimed Dutch values that were wrested from other conservative groups gave priority to maintaining them in the face of Muslim, conservative immigrants.

### **Implications of the Rotterdam Code for Muslims**

The effects of the Rotterdam *Code* can be viewed in different ways. Some reactions are that this policy is not strict enough and *real* restrictions must be placed on immigrants in order to

have them become fully integrated into Dutch society. Other responses hold that this type of code serves to only further the separation between the native Dutch citizens and the immigrants. The *Code* was the first of its kind, but with immigration tensions rising throughout Europe, it might not be the last (Potts 2006). Since violation of this *Code* does not lead to any sanctions, individuals are essentially free to make their own decisions about whether or not they want to conform. The main form of “enforcement” would then be left to social acceptance and social pressures to fit in with conventional practices of Dutch lifestyles.

Many say that tougher measures will be needed to compel immigrants to integrate into such a vastly different culture than those in which they previously lived (Hundley 2009). Policies like the *Code* seem to try to hedge controversy, resulting in a watered-down version of the regulations many would prefer to have implemented. Public reactions have favored ideas to strengthen policies, and as suggested may lead to an increase in enforceable policy that would have broader effects than this statement.

Other responses to the Rotterdam *Code* have come from Dutch Muslims who claim that any attempts to legislate cultural norms will only widen the gap between Muslims and the native Dutch (Hundley 2009). This is exactly what the *Code* has tried to avoid. It was the opinion of Dutch citizens that immigrants needed to be aware of Dutch values and laws, and also assimilate to them in order to maintain the cohesive ideals of a Western society. Bridging social capital has long been necessary to at least some extent, particularly after the collapse of the pillars in the Netherlands. An alternative points out that while a gap might be created between Muslims and native Dutch by legislation, Muslims need their own enlightenment of values and intellectualism in order to become a 21<sup>st</sup> century civilization (Buruma 2006:28). Without prominent figures to look to, and modern ideas of respect and tolerance, many believe that Muslims will continue to

cause fear and tension among Western societies that have long been enlightened. Overall, there are various effects of this *Code*, with the reactions of the Dutch pointing to more regulation and change, and those of the Muslims pointing to independence as a route for cohesion. With these contradictory solutions, a combination of bridging and bonding social capital may be necessary to attain some form of compromise or unity.

### **Current Policies & Policy Outlook**

Information on Dutch legislation was difficult to find, and only the basic Dutch Immigration Services website was fully available in English, but no other languages. There were forms, contact information and basic facts available on the website, though no actual legislation was available in any language other than Dutch, leaving the process to look very unaccommodating ("Immigration" 2009). As mentioned previously, the immigration procedures must be completed by immigrants prior to their arrival in the Netherlands. These restrictions cause greater responsibility to be taken by immigrants, but also assure that the Netherlands will receive immigrants with a certain level of education, language skills and cultural understanding. Upon arrival, immigrants will at least know what values are held by the Dutch, though they might not agree with them, and this could lead to greater assimilation in the Netherlands without the necessity of more restrictive national policies.

At the time this *Code* was passed, the outlook for similar ideas in the Netherlands was mixed. Rita Verdonk, Minister of Integration at the time was a proponent of this legislation and was in favor of implementing such policies nation-wide. Verdonk commented that immigrants were not often clear about what was expected of them in the Netherlands ("Verdonk" 2006). No policy like this has been enacted on a national level since the Rotterdam *Code* was created, although other national immigration policies have continued to emerge.

An innovative approach to these issues faced by policymakers and immigrants alike would be to take the perspective of fulfilling the necessities of immigrants so that they can come to some important realizations on their own. The idea that individuals, specifically Muslims, need the freedom to liberate themselves from their own traditions is a powerful concept (Bruckner 2007). This proposes that without some intervention of the government, Muslims would continue to follow the scripts they maintained in their home country, without acknowledging the differences in their new country. Too much bonding social capital within immigrant groups in a new country could cause an increase in close-mindedness regarding traditions considered by many to be "backwards". Women must legally gain the respect mandated by Dutch society in order to break away from the confines of the religious structures that have stayed with them during their immigration. This argument holds that intercession is a necessity in order to achieve a level of social integration of Muslim immigrants. Without this involvement, Muslim immigrants would be left to their own devices, and largely unwilling to emerge from their comfort zones to openly adapt to a society with which they may not completely agree. The agreement with Western beliefs is not what is mandated by policies like the *Code*, but merely the mutual respect between Muslim immigrants and the Dutch natives to achieve a cohesive society.

### **Dutch Social Capital**

Historically, pillarization was a system based on total bonding social capital without the presence of any ideas of bridging social capital. There was no connection between any of the Dutch sub-groups, yet this system worked for centuries. However, this system has collapsed and been replaced with an assimilation-based system that depends on bridging to integrate Muslim immigrants into the collaborative, non-denominational, historic Dutch culture. The effect of this

policy is that it is trying to force bridging to occur between native citizens and Muslim immigrants. Though some assistance may be necessary, the total compulsion to bridge may not be as effective. The way the *Code* is used may be better at integrating bridging social capital than the Danish policies since it is not an enforceable law, but rather a recommendation for community living. It calls for respect from all citizens rather than the outright denouncement of specific views.

As a whole, the Netherlands might not be any better than Denmark at employing bridging social capital, but while looking at the particular policies the Rotterdam *Code* does better to encourage cohesion than the almost accusatory nature of the Danish program with its focus on Muslims. Explicit targeting of "extreme" Muslim views seems to be less cooperative when compared to the Netherlands and the *Code's* simple call for respect.

### **Incompatibility of Views Between Muslim Immigrants and Native Citizens**

From a nationalistic point of view, one held by Denmark and arguably the Netherlands, there seems to be a basic incompatibility between the liberal, democratic cultures of Europe and the Muslim culture. There are beliefs that Islam cannot be merely reduced to the private sphere because it generates both public and private demands, leaving essential conflicts between that way of life and the basic republican tradition (Brubaker 1992:149). Through this mesh of public and private spheres, there is also the combination of religious and political views that at times result in extremist ideas and/or actions. Social capital is the concept of network cooperation based on mutual trust (Nannestad 2008:610). Extremism and radicalization of views serve to completely undermine achieved trust, and therefore deteriorate the society in which this occurs. Consequently, the roles of immigration policies in Denmark and the Netherlands *may* in effect

target Muslims, but only because the Muslims are the individuals who are hampering each country's attempt at social cohesion through common culture.

### **Fear as a Prompt for Policy Change**

Fear of Islam has a tradition going back to medieval times, and in recent years contradiction between fundamentalism and secularism has led to an increase in this emotion (Castles & Miller 2003:239). The fear felt by citizens throughout Europe is not just fear of the Islamic faith. Fear of cultural change due to the influx of immigrants can heighten the fear of violence that results from clashing cultural values. Bridging social capital is needed for integration, but the existence of bonding social capital within Muslim immigrant groups does not impede the establishment of bridging social capital; in fact it might facilitate it (Nannestad 2008:607). There is then no real need to disincentivize or look down upon cohesion within immigrant groups through policy implementation. The fear of cultural change does not need to be based on the unknowns of Muslim culture, but can instead be turned into an opportunity for cultural interchange of ideas and ways of life. Programs facilitating shared culture can benefit all individuals in society, and through these experiences bridging between immigrants and non-immigrants could also be enhanced. Though the countries discussed may not completely agree with this viewpoint, there are ways to work around the cohesiveness of one group, and still be able to integrate that group into a functioning society.

A fear of the imminent collapse of the universal welfare states in both Denmark and the Netherlands is a relevant point. The success of the welfare state depends on high levels of interpersonal trust and cooperation, factors that are not necessarily found within immigration societies (Miller 2007:378). Immigrants have been noted as being largely dependent on such a system, without having anything to contribute back to it through taxes. With such a strong

welfare state, immigrants are able to free-ride quite easily, so integration remains modest and does not seem necessary (Nannestad 2008:608). Through the use of bridging social capital between immigrants and native citizens, the incentive for free-riding can be weakened or even eliminated (Nannestad 2008:610) because of the greater understanding established through interaction with the net contributors of the system; thus preventing total collapse. This means that if immigrants and native citizens forge new networks and relationships, they will begin to understand one another's cultural values and priorities; one of which being the importance of and dependence on the national welfare state. The fear of a welfare state collapse could then be mitigated and lead to a better sense of understanding, cohesion, and bridging within each country.

### **More Regulation Necessary**

Based on the conclusions drawn from the study of Danish and Dutch immigration policies, there seems to be a call from the native citizens of these countries for a further increase in regulation. A type of "social equilibrium" is created by the clash of conflicting cultural values and norms which will eventually lead to assimilation, though the velocity of absorption varies with language, race, and most obviously, religion (Portes 1989:614). Action against the objectionable features of Muslim society that conflict so greatly with liberal democratic values must be taken.

Without increased regulation, there seems to be a tolerance of *all* beliefs of the Muslim culture, a tolerance that would lead to an increase in the exact type of culture the Dutch and Danish natives are trying to prevent. Tolerance harbors contempt because it assumes that these certain groups are incapable of modernizing to the level on which we live, and the politics of appeasement will only increase their appetite for accomplishment (Bruckner 2007). Bridging

social capital is considered to be crucial for turning individual immigrants into equal citizens who are able to stand on their own feet and participate in society (Scholten & Holzacker 2009:97). Examples of effective bridging social capital could include friendships between neighbors or simple network connections between individuals in similar types of work. The regulations suggested by these governments are an attempt to placate both of the previous concerns. The policies are created in such a way that they give the immigrants space and new freedoms to experience the liberal society and all that it has to offer, even though immigrants may not fully agree with the moral aspects of the remainder of the social arena. Through these policies, the governments are trying to create what they see as the best environment for living. The welfare-state has created these long-standing beliefs in equality and universalism that result in the fight for one's individual rights in a culture where freedom is the highest held claim.

### **Contradictory Conclusions**

Through the research conducted on immigration policy programs in Denmark and the Netherlands it is easy to see how they have some similarities in policy aims, though there are discrepancies in their means to arrive at those ends. The importance of integration and assimilation into their respective societies will probably remain the goals that these countries have in mind until further changes occur. Social capital has a strong undercurrent that is visible throughout policies like these. While bridging social capital has been viewed as inclusive and socially lubricating, bonding social capital has at times been seen as exclusive, though this should not be the case (Nannestad 2008:613). The key to social capital's creation of cohesion within a society depends on the combination of bridging and bonding social capital that results in a society based on trust and mutual understanding.

Many of the specific issues examined within these immigration programs can turn out to be quite contradictory in reality. For example, in Denmark the immigration laws are quite restrictive and long-lasting for all immigrants, while some policy programs have an even larger effect on the way of life for minorities, like Muslims, as well. Despite the strict regulations, the information for immigrants is made publicly available online, and is easily accessible through many different languages. In the Netherlands, the Dutch have maintained a multicultural sense of respect toward immigrants and individuals with different backgrounds, but have also established restrictions that show the necessity of assimilating, at least in the public realm. The real question remains, what is the appropriate response?

The Netherlands has reacted with a policy that does not completely restrict immigration, but it may regulate the types of immigrants who choose to go to their country. By mandating that the immigration program and exams be completed in one's country of origin, the Dutch have created an upper echelon of immigrants who tend to arrive. The financial burden caused by the expensive preparation materials and testing is more than simply the transportation costs that one might need to arrive elsewhere. The information contained within the orientation film and other cultural materials may also serve as a disincentive for possible immigrants, particularly Muslims, to immigrate based on personal beliefs. This propaganda may indeed be targeted to protect the Dutch from further infiltration of values that they disagree with, and as a result this policy could produce either fewer Muslim immigrants, or the same number that may harbor ill will against the Dutch population who will be seen as discriminatory and discouraging.

What seems to be the result of these contradictions in Denmark is the idea that although the Danes would like to curb further immigration to their country, in order to retain their tribal nature and cultural unity, they have a strong wish to fully integrate all immigrants who are

already in Denmark. The Danes make information and legislation easily accessible so that they can reach out to those groups who might not otherwise know how to act or what to do, and allow them to access what the Danes believe to be necessary information. In this way, the targeting of Muslims in Denmark through various programs can be seen as the Danes reaching out to immigrants in order to assist them in making the easiest and most rewarding transition possible. Their resignation to these immigrants seems to culminate in a whole-hearted attempt at integration that brings immigrants fully into the social, cultural and economic society of Denmark.

It is important to look outside of what Denmark and the Netherlands have previously or are currently attempting to sustain with regards to immigration policy. A broader idea could result in a compromise between Muslim immigrants (and immigrants in general) and the Danish and Dutch native citizens. The recognition that each side claims certain rights against the other, while at the same time acknowledges certain obligations, could result in the cohesion necessary for an integrated and content society (Miller 2007:371). This solution may seem to be uncomplicated, but in reality it would take great coordination and compromise between two groups who do not usually see eye-to-eye. With increased trust and some consideration of the part of both Muslim immigrants and the native citizens of Denmark and the Netherlands, an accepting or at least tolerant resolution can be attained.

### **Deterrence as an Effect of Immigration Policies**

Immigration in the Netherlands has drastically changed in the few years since implementation of the new policy requiring immigration procedures to be completed in one's country of origin. The rate of immigration did rise in 2007 by 15%, although the increase was due to a flood of immigrants from new EU countries like Poland and Bulgaria ("Population

Growth" 2008). Compared to Turkey and Morocco (the most common countries of origin for Muslim immigrants arriving in the Netherlands), five times as many Poles, three times as many Germans and two times as many Bulgarians arrived in 2007 ("Population Growth" 2008). These eastern Europeans are not required to take any of the immigration tests and this has led to the rise in their immigration, while Muslim immigrants from Turkey and Morocco have drastically decreased (Casciani & Peter 2008).

At the same time, unemployment in the Netherlands began to decrease after the passage of the new immigration legislation. From a rate of 6.5% in both 2004 and 2005, the unemployment rate decreased further to only 3.9% by 2008 ("Monthly data" 2009). Although in 2009 the rate increased (most likely due to the global recession), the coincidental drop by nearly 3% in three years is noteworthy. Possible explanations include the idea that job programs and placement for new immigrants may have started to work on a higher level, or there may have been an increase in jobs in general for the country. The education level of new immigrants may also add to the change in unemployment, considering that all immigrants from outside the EU must now be able to read, and pass tests on Dutch culture and language before arriving in the Netherlands. The socio-economic statuses of immigrants from non-EU countries have also probably increased due to the costs of preparation materials and testing services for all immigrants wishing to enter the Netherlands. These preconditions have made for a more educated immigrant population and therefore could be a major effect of Dutch policy that has contributed to the decrease in unemployment as well as Muslim immigration since 2006.

In Denmark, immigration totals for family reunification and asylum have decreased since 2003 and remained stable since then, although the percentage of these two groups out of the entire population of "immigrants" has continued to decrease steadily since 2003. In 2003 these

same groups made up 26% of all immigrants, and each year this percentage has decreased arriving at a mere 8.5% in 2008 (Grunnet 2009). Part of the reason for this occurrence is based on the fact that the total number of immigrants, including those entering with work permits, student permits and as EU nationals, has continued to increase each year. In 2008 there were a total of over 69,000 individuals entering Denmark compared to just over 31,000 a mere five years earlier (Grunnet 2009). So although the number of immigrants arriving from mainly Muslim countries has been decreasing, the total number of foreign born citizens in Denmark has increased in the past decade. Despite immigrants arriving from all over Europe and beyond, the current legislation continues to mainly target individuals who enter the country under auspices of need rather than those who enter for work, schooling or under laws of the European Union; all groups that are generally exempt from immigration and integration legislation in Denmark.

In both countries, although the total number of immigrants entering the country has risen in the past decade, the number of immigrants seeking asylum or family reunification, thus those from predominantly Muslim countries, has dramatically decreased. The main effect of policies in both Denmark and the Netherlands has been one of deterrence. The policies and ideals that are commonly portrayed by these countries are not ones that invoke a welcoming message or even a tolerant mood. This decrease in Muslims arriving in Denmark and the Netherlands is a result of the continuing strides toward assimilationist policies and integration-focused populations.

### **Possibilities of Social Capital**

Both countries' policies focus on bridging social capital and attempt to minimize the influence of bonding social capital on their societies. The governments find bridging to be more important for the public sphere and the welfare of the nation as a whole. The policies acknowledge the necessity of aspects of shared culture and integration, while allowing for some

cultural individuality within the private sphere. That being said, there are exceptions for ideals and actions that may be deemed illegal in each country, such as honor killings and female circumcision.

Neither country is doing a particularly good job using bridging social capital since both are imposing restrictions on immigrants that attempt to *force* them to bridge instead of letting nature take its course. The path of natural connection may be preferred, although it is important to acknowledge that without the assistance of the government, bridging may not occur naturally or groups may even become more polarized and bonded within themselves. There are no positive incentives created for bridging, instead too much bonding is simply disincentivized and looked down upon, even though bonding can be helpful in establishing inter-network relationships. Both Denmark and the Netherlands see a need for social cohesion, but in the form of assimilation and integration, *not* mutual cooperation.

Overall, both countries are not being very successful at encouraging social cohesion through their use of bonding and bridging social capital. Their only solutions to this constant separation between native citizens and Muslim immigrants are to add more restrictions upon the immigrants that force greater integration into native cultures. The use of such measures seems unfair to Muslims since it calls for a major rejection of past values, and could be more valuable with increased compromise. In lieu of compromise, the imposition of additional restrictions may be the only effective way to accomplish the goals of integration in both Denmark and the Netherlands.

### **Further Research**

To address these and other issues, an important factor would be to consider the questions regarding immigration over a longer period of time. Since the issues discussed have only been

around for a few decades, at most, results of further research may be more telling after current policies have been in effect for much longer than a few years. Over time, the shifts that are occurring as a result of new policies can become more noticeable and through these observations one could be able to see how Muslims are affected more wholly by immigration policies in Denmark and the Netherlands. The time needed to reach a broader conclusion may need to be longer than the decade reviewed within this project.

Beyond this research, there is the question of whether or not religion or cultural status has anything to do with the inequalities present in immigration. Many of the challenges of integration have nothing to do with religion or culture, but instead are based on poor socioeconomic conditions and the lack of educational capital within immigrants and their descendents (Laurence & Vaisse 2006:10). By looking solely at the socioeconomic status, education level, or language barriers faced by immigrants, different conclusions may be drawn about the best possible way to integrate immigrants and achieve social cohesion in a given country.

## Appendix

Immigration Information		
	Denmark	Netherlands
Population:	5.5 Million <sup>1</sup>	16.7 Million <sup>2</sup>
Immigrants:	8.4% of population <sup>3</sup>	19% of population <sup>4</sup>
Muslims:	2% of population <sup>5</sup>	6% of population <sup>6</sup>
Immigration Requirements:	Program completed in first 3 years: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Language classes</li> <li>• Language exam</li> <li>• Culture exam<sup>7</sup></li> </ul>	Expectations <i>before</i> immigration: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Culture film &amp; test</li> <li>• Language exam</li> <li>• Housing &amp; financial requirements</li> <li>- Also a 3-5 year program upon arrival <sup>8</sup></li> </ul>
Immigration Services:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stipend, health services through welfare</li> <li>• Job services</li> <li>• Integration Council<sup>9</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Health services &amp; welfare as needed</li> <li>• Job services</li> <li>• Muslim Council<sup>10</sup></li> </ul>

## Source:

<sup>1</sup> "Denmark" 2009<sup>2</sup> "Netherlands" 2009<sup>3</sup> Hedetoft 2006<sup>4</sup> Casciani & Peter 2008<sup>5</sup> "Denmark" 2009<sup>6</sup> "Netherlands" 2009<sup>7</sup> Andersen 2007<sup>8</sup> Casciani & Peter 2008<sup>9</sup> Andersen 2007<sup>10</sup> Casciani & Peter 2008

## Works Cited

- "A comprehensive integration initiative – and better integration." 2006. *The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs*. Retrieved September 19, 2009. <[http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/Integration/a\\_comprehensive\\_integration\\_initiative/a\\_comprehensive\\_inte\\_gration\\_initiative.htm](http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/Integration/a_comprehensive_integration_initiative/a_comprehensive_inte_gration_initiative.htm)>.
- "Aliens (Consolidation) Act." 2008. *New to Denmark*. The Danish Immigration Service. Retrieved September 23, 2009. <[http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/C2A9678D-73B3-41B0-A076-67C6660E482B/0/alens\\_consolidation\\_act\\_english.pdf](http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/C2A9678D-73B3-41B0-A076-67C6660E482B/0/alens_consolidation_act_english.pdf)>.
- Andersen, John, Jørgen Elm Larsen, and Iver Hornemann Møller. 2009. "The exclusion and marginalization of immigrants in the Danish welfare society: Dilemmas and challenges." *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*. 29(5/6): 274-286.
- Andersen, Jørgen Goul. 2007. "Restricting access to social protection for immigrants in the Danish welfare state." *Benefits*. 15(3): 257-269.
- Bail, Christopher A. 2008. "The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in Europe." *American Sociological Review*. 73: 37-59.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bruckner, Pascal. 2007. "Enlightenment fundamentalism or racism of the anti-racists?" Signandsight.com. Retrieved October 23, 2009. <<http://www.signandsight.com/features/1146.html>>.
- Buruma, Ian. 2006. *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance*. New York, NY: The Penguin Press.
- Casciani, Dominic and Laurence Peter. "Should UK Immigration go Dutch?" 2008. *BBC NEWS.com*, October 21. Retrieved January 6, 2010. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7682858.stm>>.
- Castles, Stephen and Mark Miller. 2003. *The Age of Migration*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
- Coenders, Marcel, Marcel Lubbers, Peer Scheepers, and Maykel Verkuyten. 2008. "More than Two Decades of Changing Ethnic Attitudes in the Netherlands." *Journal of Social Issues*. 64(2): 269-285.
- Cohen, Job. 2006. "Can a Minority Retain Its Identity in Law? The 2005 Maltatuli Lecture in the Netherlands." in *Political Theologies: Public Relations in a Post-secular World* edited by Hent deVries and Lawrence Sullivan. New York, NY: Fordham University Press. 539-556.

- Cornelius, Wayne and Takeyuki Tsuda. 2004. "Controlling Immigration: The Limits of Government Intervention." in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, by Cornelius, Wayne, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. pg. 3-48.
- Crul, Maurice and Hans Vermeulen. 2006. "Immigration, education, and the Turkish second generation in five European nations: A comparative study." in *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, by Craig Parsons and Timothy Smeeding, eds. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pg. 235-250.
- "Denmark." 2009. *The CIA's World Factbook*. Retrieved November 17, 2009. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/da.html>>.
- Fair, Linda S. 2008. "The New Diversity in Denmark: Integration Challenges for Danes, Immigrants and Refugees." *The International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations*. 8(5): 225-236.
- "Family." 2009. *New to Denmark*. The Danish Immigration Service, Retrieved October 28, 2009. <[http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/citizenship/citizen\\_in\\_denmark/6%20family.html](http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/citizenship/citizen_in_denmark/6%20family.html)>.
- Forsander, Annika. 2004. "Social Capital in the Context of Immigration and Diversity: Economic Participation in the Nordic Welfare States." *Journal of International Migration and Integration*. 5(2): 207-222.
- Geddes, Andrew. 2003. *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publishing Inc.
- Grunnet, Henrik. 2009. *Statistical Overview: Migration and Asylum 2008*. Copenhagen, DK: The Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. Retrieved January 6, 2010. <<http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B219C8ED-CF9C-4C11-8ECF-81E6C2898B90/0/StatisticalOverview2008.pdf>>.
- Hedetoft, Ulf. 2003. "'Cultural transformation': how Denmark faces immigration." London: Open Democracy News Analysis. Retrieved October 23, 2009. <[http://www.opendemocracy.net/people-migrationeurope/article\\_1563.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/people-migrationeurope/article_1563.jsp)>.
- Hedetoft, Ulf. 2006. "Denmark: Integrating Immigrants into a Homogenous Welfare State." *Migration Information Source*. Retrieved January 6, 2010. <<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=485>>.
- Hegge, Per Egil. 2004. "The Immigrants are Coming!" *Scandinavian Review*. 92(1): 47-51.
- Hirsi Ali, Ayaan. 2007. *Infidel*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Hundley, Tom. 2009 "Dutch to Muslims: Do you really want to settle here?" *Chicago Tribune*, April 9. Retrieved November 3, 2009. <<http://www.religionnewsblog.com/14258/dutch-to-muslims-do-you-really-want-to-settle-here>>.

"Immigration and Naturalization Services." 2009. *Dutch Ministry of Justice*. Retrieved November 2, 2009. <<http://www.ind.nl/EN/>>.

Jackson, Pamela Irving and Roderick Parkes. 2007. "Parallel Societies, Cultural Tolerance and Securitization: Muslims and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Western Democracies." *Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries*. Fall 2007/Winter 2008(3.1): 7-42.

Klausen, Jytte. 2005. *The Islamic Challenge*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Kramer, Jane. 2006. "The Dutch Model: Multiculturalism and Muslim immigrants." *The New Yorker*, August 4. Retrieved September 15, 2009. <[http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lncademc/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21\\_T7462368055&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29\\_T7462368061&cisb=22\\_T7462368060&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&selRCNodeID=64&nodeStateId=411en\\_US,1,41&docsInCategory=3&csi=237442&docNo=1](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lncademc/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7462368055&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T7462368061&cisb=22_T7462368060&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&selRCNodeID=64&nodeStateId=411en_US,1,41&docsInCategory=3&csi=237442&docNo=1)>.

Kristensen, Catharina Juul. 2007. "Towards Two-tier Universalism? A Discussion of the Welfare Principle." *Journal of Social Sciences*. 3(2): 52-59.

Laurence, Jonathan and Justin Vaisse. 2006. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Lawler, Peter. 2007. "Janus-Faced Solidarity: Danish Internationalism Reconsidered." *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*. 42(1): 101-126.

Leiken, Robert S. 2005. "Europe's Angry Muslims." *Foreign Affairs*. 84(4): 120-135.

Messina, Anthony. 2007. *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Miller, David. 2007. "Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship." *The Journal of Political Philosophy*. 16(4): 371-390.

Monsma, Stephen and J. Christopher Soper. 1997. *The Challenges of Pluralism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

"Monthly data labour force." 2009. *Statistics Netherlands*, December 19. Retrieved January 6, 2010. <<http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLLEN&PA=70173eng&D1=9-14&D2=0&D3=0&D4=64,77,90,101-126&LA=EN&HDR=T&STB=G2,G3,G1&VW=T>>.

- Morawska, Eva. 2008. "Research on Immigration/Ethnicity in Europe and the United States: A Comparison." *The Sociological Quarterly*. 49: 465-482.
- Nannestad, Peter. 2004. "Immigration as a challenge to the Danish welfare state?" *European Journal of Political Economy*. 20(2004): 755-767.
- Nannestad, Peter, Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen. 2008. "Bridge Over Troubled Water? Migration and Social Capital." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 34(4): 607-631.
- "Netherlands." 2009. *The CIA's World Factbook*. Retrieved November 17, 2009. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nl.html>>.
- "New to Denmark." 2009. *New to Denmark*. The Danish Immigration Service. Retrieved November 16, 2009. <<http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-US/>>.
- Omestad, Thomas. 2007. "Culture Clash in Denmark." *U.S. News and World Report*, January 8. 142(1): 40-45.
- Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2003. "Counting the Cost: Denmark's Changing Migration Policies." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. 27(2): 448-454.
- Parsons, Craig and Timothy Smeeding. 2006. "What's unique about immigration in Europe?" in *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, by Craig Parsons and Timothy Smeeding, eds. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pg. 1-29.
- "Population Growth 46 Thousand in 2007." 2008. *Statistics Netherlands*, February 15. Retrieved January 6, 2010. <<http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2008/2008-011-pb.htm>>.
- Portes, Alejandro and József Böröcz. 1989. "Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives On Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation." *International Migration Review*. 23(3): 606-627.
- Potts, Nina Marie. 2006. "Code of Conduct for Immigrants Leads to Tension in Rotterdam." *VOAnews.com*, February 14. Retrieved November 3, 2009. <<http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-02/2006-02-14-voa48.cfm>>.
- "Prevention of radicalisation." 2009. *The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs*. Retrieved October 20, 2009. <[http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/citizenship/prevention\\_of\\_radicalisation/prevention\\_of\\_radicalisation.htm](http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/citizenship/prevention_of_radicalisation/prevention_of_radicalisation.htm)>.
- Rex, John. 1994. "The Political Sociology of Multiculturalism and the Place of Muslims in West European Societies." *Social Compass*. 41(1): 79-92.

- "Rotterdamers Divided over Code of Conduct." 2006. *NIS News Bulletin*, February 22. Retrieved November 3, 2009. <[http://www.nisnews.nl/dossiers/immigration/220206\\_1016.htm](http://www.nisnews.nl/dossiers/immigration/220206_1016.htm)>.
- Scholten, Peter and Ronald Holz hacker. 2009. "Bonding, bridging and ethnic minorities in the Netherlands: changing discourses in a changing nation." *Nations and Nationalism*. 15(1): 81-100.
- Shadid, Wasif A. 2006. "Public Debates over Islam and the Awareness of Muslim Identity in the Netherlands." *European Education*. 38(2): 10-22.
- Stokes, Bruce. 2005. "Immigration Tests Holland's Tolerance." *National Journal*. 37(45): 3466-3468.
- "UNHCR Treaty Follow-Up." 2006. *UN Human Rights Treaty System*. Retrieved October 28, 2009. <[http://www.bayefsky.com/html/denmark\\_cerd\\_follow\\_report.php](http://www.bayefsky.com/html/denmark_cerd_follow_report.php)>.
- van de Vijver, Fons J.R., Seger M. Breugelmans, and Saskia R.G. Schalk-Soekar. 2007. "Multiculturalism: Construct validity and stability." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*. 32(2008): 93-104.
- van der Veer, Peter. 2006. "Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh and the Politics of Tolerance in the Netherlands." in *Political Theologies: Public Relations in a Post-secular World* edited by Hent deVries and Lawrence Sullivan. New York, NY: Fordham University Press. 527-538.
- van Houdt, Friso. 2008. "Citizenship as Instrument of Bio-Power: Identifying Changes in the Functioning of Citizenship in the Netherlands in Times of Glocalization and Culturistic Discourse." Inclusion and Exclusion in Contemporary European Societies Conference, April 14. Retrieved November 3, 2009. <[http://www.inclusionexclusion.nl/site/?Previous\\_editions:Edition\\_2008:Papers\\_Participants](http://www.inclusionexclusion.nl/site/?Previous_editions:Edition_2008:Papers_Participants)>.
- "Verdonk backs code of conduct to bolster Dutch ID." 2006. *Crossroads Magazine*, January 23. Retrieved November 3, 2009. <<http://crossroadsmag.eu/2006/01/verdonk-backs-code-of-conduct-to-bolster-dutch-id/>>.