

South Africa's New Segregation: The Continuation of Racial Isolation in the Post-Apartheid Era

Emery Williams

Senior Sociology Comps

January 27, 2010

Abstract

This paper looks at racial residential segregation in post-apartheid South Africa through a multiple source analysis. It argues that although there may be progress in the desegregation of the country as a whole, the majority of the non-white population (specifically the black population) continues to live in areas that have a singular race majority. It will be looking at causal factors from both macro (policy) and micro (individual) levels in order to understand why segregation is still occurring and to what extent it is occurring. This research is also concerned with the various forms that segregation occurs in. While segregation can be physical, it can also be social. The author will argue that in the post-apartheid era, a “new segregation” has arisen. This segregation has occurred as a result of a lack of social integration within physically desegregated areas. While government policy has placed a priority on creating an equal and multiracial society through physical desegregation and social integration, the legacy of apartheid continues to overwhelm these efforts.

Introduction

I intend to examine the issue of racial residential segregation in post-apartheid South Africa. Through my research I hope to answer what macro (i.e., political and economical) and micro (i.e., perceptions and identity) factors are preventing complete racial residential desegregation in certain geographic areas now that the political and legal constraints of apartheid have been lifted. I also wish to examine what factors are hampering social integration within desegregated areas.

Since the focus of this paper will be on various types of segregation and desegregation in South Africa, most of the case studies and theories will come from research on South Africa. However, because the United States has had a similar history of racial segregation followed by a problematic process of integration there will be times when theory and patterns concerning racial segregation within the United States will be applied to the South African question.

Desegregation is measured quantitatively. According to census data, a neighborhood or suburb is considered to be desegregated when no one racial group constitutes more than 50% of the population. There must also be one other racial group present that accounts for at least 25%

of the population. On the other hand, social integration is measured qualitatively. Integration is assessed through factors such as friendship, local identity, the sharing of local facilities, and multi-racial involvement in local institutions, both political and non-political. Desegregation is the physical existence of different racial groups in a shared residential space, whereas social integration refers to “micro-level relations between people of different races” (Lemanski 2006: 564-65). I am specifically interested in juxtaposing desegregation and a lack of social integration (social isolation) in my research. The South African government seems to hold the position that policy can dictate desegregation, after which integration will naturally follow. However, much of my research implies that this is not the case (Lemon 2005; Lemanski 2006; Christopher 2005; Durrheim & Dixon 2005; Charles 2003; Bergers & van der Lugt 2006). There are many neighborhoods in South Africa that are technically desegregated according to census data. Yet within these areas, social integration between racial groups is not occurring. I believe that this phenomenon is important because the lack of social integration within desegregated areas seems to be a new form of segregation—a concept that will be developed throughout this paper.

The extent of racial segregation in South Africa today is still very high. When the African National Congress (ANC) was democratically elected in April of 1994, one of its major goals was to dismantle apartheid. However, the process of deracializing South Africa has been a very slow one. Table 1 reveals the number and percentage of people within different racial groups living in areas with a single-race majority in 1996 and in 2001.

Table 1. Populations living in predominately one-race (over 80 per cent) areas, 1996-2001

Group	1996		2001	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
African	12,347,485	91.6	15,060,315	90.0
Coloured	2,400,471	80.0	2,657,953	76.6
Asian	725,578	71.3	662,267	60.8
White	18,167,061	67.0	2,168,416	55.1
Total	18,167,061	84.4	20,548,951	81.4

Source: Christopher (2005). Calculated by the author from unpublished enumeration tract data supplied by Statistics South Africa.

From this table, it is clear that the African population of South Africa is experiencing the highest level of segregation. While the overall percentage for Africans decreased by 1.6 percent from 1996 to 2001, the number of Africans living in a predominately one-race area increased by number due to population growth. Although all other non-white groups were affected by apartheid legislation (and removed from urban centers) as well, their population percentage decreased by significantly larger percentages than the African population. Therefore, in order to have a more focused analysis, this paper will be focusing solely on segregation of the black population in South Africa.

I became interested in the issue of desegregation in South Africa during my semester abroad in the fall of 2008 at the University of Cape Town. Prior to going, I did some basic research on the country I would be living in for the next four months. Because apartheid legislation was repealed in 1991 and a new government was created in 1994, I thought I would see some residual racial tension and a bit of separation between racial groups. When I arrived, the amount of segregation and vocal racism I saw and heard was astonishing. I truly became interested in segregation and social isolation of population groups when I began to observe spatial patterns of race on the University of Cape Town campus. There is a sprawling staircase in

the center of campus near the library that is a popular hangout for students between classes. What I began to see each day was that, although the campus population was extremely diverse, population groups seemed to sit only with each other on the steps. I saw whites sitting with other whites, Asians with other Asians, coloureds with other coloureds, and blacks sitting with blacks. Of course, there were exceptions to this pattern, but the large majority of students were not integrating with members of other racial groups. This image became ingrained in my head. A series of questions began to develop in my mind: Why were white South Africans still so blatantly and openly racist toward black South Africans? Why was there such a strong lack of social integration between groups? Why were township populations still so uni-racial? It was these burning questions that led me to this research.

A Brief History of South Africa

It is important to look at the history of South Africa before and during apartheid in order to gain a better understanding of current race relations and desegregation policies. Even before apartheid, there were segregationist policies. One example of an early segregationist piece of legislation was the Urban Areas Act of 1923. This act provided municipalities with the power to create townships for African residents. Townships are urban living areas that were reserved for non-white population groups during apartheid. They are built on the peripheries of large towns and cities in South Africa. A large portion of urban blacks were relocated to these townships and kept there through “pass laws”—a group of laws under the Urban Areas Act that restricted black movement. This group of laws was the predecessor to the Group Areas Act of 1950, the piece of legislation marking the beginning of apartheid which guaranteed that land ownership and occupancy within cities was determined based on race. Therefore, during apartheid the white population of South Africa was the only population group living in cities. Land was sectioned off

on the peripheries of cities for the following population groups of South Africa: Africans/Blacks, descendents of peoples indigenous to Africa; Indians/Asians, descendents of peoples indigenous to Asia and the sub-continent of India; and coloureds, mixed people of light-skinned indigenous people of the Western Cape and descendents of slaves imported into South Africa during the 17th and 18th centuries (Christopher 2005). Townships were created on peripheries of cities with an adequate amount of land left free between townships and the closest white neighborhoods to create a buffer between the races. Although the “pass laws” were repealed in 1986 and the Group Areas Act in 1991, townships continue to exist in the post-apartheid era. (Morris 1998)

Another central aspect of the apartheid system was the creation of “homelands.” The South African government did not wish to seem overtly racist. Therefore, government leaders decided to implement a policy that would create separate, self-governing territories for the black (also called Bantu) population. This policy which became known as the “Bantustan program” came into effect in 1959 with the passing of the Promotion of Black Self Government program. By allowing blacks to self-govern, white leaders tried to create the appearance of promoting democracy (Deegan 2001: 35).

The homelands were areas that were created to hold specific black ethnic groups such as the Zulu, the Xhosa, and the Swazi peoples. Thirteen percent of South Africa’s land was divided into the following ten homelands: Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, Transkei, and Venda (Thornton & Byrnes 1997: 112). The homelands were carved out of rural areas allocated to them (See Appendix A). These areas were quite small and deemed inadequate to support the black population by a government commission in the 1950s (Byrnes 1997: liii-liv). These findings were overlooked however, and according to Deegan (2001), by the 1960s, the population of the homelands had risen 70 percent through

forced removals of black South Africans from designated “white areas” (36). When looking at segregation in South Africa today, one can divide black South Africans into three basic groups. There are those who lived in South Africa’s urban centers and were relocated to either townships on the periphery of these cities or to homelands, those who were already living in lands designated as homelands and thus did not have to move, and those living in rural areas who were moved to the homelands. South African blacks who were forced to relocate during apartheid can be further subdivided into more specific groups as shown in Table 2.

Table 2 Population affected by removal or relocation, 1955-1980

Type of removal	Numbers
Eviction of black tenants, squatters and surplus labor from ‘white’ farmland	1,129,000
Clearance of ‘black spots’ and ‘homeland’ consolidation	674,000
Urban relocation and removal from ‘white’ areas to ‘homeland’ townships	670,000
Removal from unauthorized (spontaneous) urban settlements	112,000
‘Group area’ removals arising from racial rezoning	834,400
Relocation due to development schemes and clearing sensitive areas	23,500
Political moves such as banishment and flight from oppression	50,000
Other miscellaneous moves	30,000
Total	3,522,900

Source: Deegan (2001). The Surplus People Project, as reported in *Race Relations News* (SAIRR), May/June 1983.

Resistance towards apartheid and residential segregation built up during the 1970’s and 1980’s, and in 1991, the Group Areas Act of 1950 was repealed. The 1991 legislation that repealed the Group Areas Act “gave all races equal rights to own property anywhere in the country...enabled suburban residents of all races to set (racially nondiscriminatory) residency standards for their neighborhoods, authorized the establishment of new townships and the

extension of services to their residents, and encouraged the development of farmland and rural communities” (Byrnes 1997: 79). In 1994, South Africa’s first multiracial elections were held. These elections resulted in the election of Nelson Mandela as president under a new governing party, the African National Congress (ANC). Although the political constraints of apartheid had been lifted, market forces and people’s socioeconomic status constrained their movement, preventing those Africans who wanted to leave the homelands and townships from entering all-white or mostly white urban areas.

This study will focus mostly on urban areas and their suburbs due to the fact that these are the areas that various ethnic groups are moving into in post-apartheid South Africa (Beinart & Dubow 1995; Morris 1998; Lemon 1991; Lodge 2003).

Literature Review

There is a great deal of literature on racial segregation which argues that policy has played a key role in the continuation of residential segregation. There is a general consensus that the government needs to be more involved for successful desegregation to take place in both South Africa (Lemanski 2006; Morris 1998; Piper 2005; Parnell & Hart 1999; Christopher 2001; Varady 2005) and the United States (Charles 2003; Burgers & van der Lugt 2006; Denton & Massey 1993; Varady 2005). Within the context of South Africa, policy designed to eliminate residential segregation is failing more than it is succeeding. There is a market-centered housing state policy (Bond & Tait 1997), but unfortunately, it is the responsibility of local or city governments in South Africa to create and implement urban infrastructural development; since these local governments lack sufficient funding, creating desegregated areas has been hard

(Morris 1998: 772). The decentralization of policy leads to a lack of resources to implement policy because local governments have fewer resources than the federal government.

The government assumed that after apartheid was lifted, “a robust, durable, job-creating economic growth would ensue, and that reconciliation would be fully embraced by white business interests” (Bond & Tait 1997: 19). A market-centered approach to the housing issue would ideally pay for new low-income housing, providing subsidized housing for poor people and workers (mostly non-white). Unfortunately, this has not worked out as well as hoped, and the market policy has “failed on its own terms and in terms of the mandate government was given to build one million houses within five years” (Bond & Tait 1997: 20). The consequences of having a market-centered housing policy include a low rate of delivery and a reproducing of apartheid-style ghettos, both of which are due to a lack of sufficient resources. Most of the land that is cheap enough to be bought for development is often near preexisting townships, strengthening and reinforcing racial lines (Morris 1998).

Another significant cause of continued segregation is the fact that the majority of black South Africans have a very low economic status. The result is that they either can't buy houses at all or they are unable to buy houses in majority white areas where real estate is expensive. The government needs to acknowledge that full desegregation cannot be accomplished if market forces are over-relied upon because blacks are at a severe disadvantage in the market. Wassmer (2005) states that “even if racial prejudice disappeared and discriminatory institutional practices were eliminated, natural market-based factors would still drive some forms of spatial segregation in metropolitan areas. Urban planners and policymakers need to understand this fact if they want to develop effective policies to promote greater levels of racial and economic integration” (159).

The ultimate failure of South Africa's "market-centered" housing policy approach marks the need to reassess current policy (Bond & Tait 1997).

The restructuring of South Africa's education system is also of great importance. Creating equality in schools would allow for black students to facilitate contact with different ethnic groups, potentially leading to social integration as well as creating a more level "playing field" in terms of job opportunities after schooling, which would lead to upward social mobility (Lemon 2005; Lemanski 2006; Lemon & Battersby-Jane 2009).

Even when the above mentioned impediments to physical segregation have been overcome in South Africa, there has been a failure to successfully integrate population groups. Current policy focuses on eliminating residential segregation with the assumption that social integration will inevitably follow. The lack of social integration is the second major threat to a successfully unified multiracial society that I will address.

There is no government policy that actively promotes social integration. There is an assumption in South Africa that the government is working towards both desegregation and social integration in the post-apartheid era but in fact, the state largely relies on nationality campaigns and national phrases (e.g., "Proudly South African", "Rainbow Nation" and "New South Africa") to promote social integration (Lemanski 2006: 565). These campaigns are not strong enough to override the negative perceptions and stereotypes between ethnic groups established over generations. Ineffectual campaigns for social integration are doing nothing to dismantle the social segregation that is occurring within statistically desegregated communities.

Just as the government is not fully following through on its stated policy of creating a more racially equal society, individuals in South Africa, while they may have made progress away

from overtly racist behavior, are still a long way from embracing the new behaviors necessary for transforming racial relations and making South Africa's new social structure successful. The negative relations among ethnic groups in South Africa have played another key role in the lack of social integration within desegregated communities (Lemanski 2006, Durrheim & Dixon 2005; Denton & Massey; Charles 2003; Burgers & van der Lugt 2006; Duckitt & Mphuthing 1998; Christopher 2001). The schism between expressed opinions and actions at the individual level can be illustrated through the "principle-implementation gap" theory. This theory hypothesizes that when society has gone through a major structural change, the new public attitudes that people express in favor of this change do not necessarily lead to a corresponding change in behavior. In the United States, this theory was developed in the early 1970s when research revealed that there was a noticeable gap between attitudes toward segregation and actual segregatory behavior. "Despite the liberalization of attitudes towards desegregation, there seemed to have been little change in segregation itself" (Durrheim & Dixon 2005, 96). This theory can also be applied to the South African question. While white South Africans may voice their "liberal" attitude concerning desegregation, they may not be practicing this liberalism in day-to-day life, instead remaining socially isolated from other population groups.

Increased contact between different groups can both facilitate social integration and in some cases impede it. According to the "intergroup contact" theory, which is also referred to as the "contact" theory, increased interaction helps people from different groups find similarities with each other, which in turn helps them to become more socially integrated. (Foster 2005; Durrheim & Dixon 2005; Lemanski 2006). However, the "paradox of contact" cautions that "prejudice is sometimes explained as a result of the *lack* of contact with members of a minority group and sometimes explained as the result of the *presence* of such contact" (Yinger & Simpson 1973: 11

as cited in Durrheim & Dixon 2005: 21). This paradox can lead to “white flight” (Wolf 1963; Schelling 1972 as cited in Lemanski 2006). White flight describes the exodus of a white population from a suburb/neighborhood once a certain number of blacks have moved in (Lemon 1991; Denton & Massey 1993). The paradox of contact theory reveals why the process of desegregating an area can actually reinforce social segregation. This issue needs to be addressed by government policy.

“Spatial assimilation” and “place stratification” models have been used in literature on the United States and South Africa to understand residential segregation through patterns of movement of various minority groups. These models use a structural lens to shed light upon the question of why there is still a pattern of physical separation of population groups within generally desegregated areas. The spatial assimilation model looks at the spatial isolation of minority groups that result from choices made by the groups themselves. In contrast, the place stratification model points to outside forces such as public perception of minority groups, policy, and economic forces as inhibitors of upward social mobility and racial integration (Massey & Denton 1993; Burgers & van der Lugt 2006; Charles 2003; Goering 2007; Lemanski 2006). In the case of the “spatial assimilation” model, segregation may not necessarily be a negative thing. Individuals could choose to live among others of their same group for economic stability or because they share the same norms and values. Segregation becomes a negative issue when those wishing to move into non-segregated communities cannot because they are impeded by outside factors.

Methodology

In researching the varying degrees of segregation and desegregation in South Africa, I will be doing a secondary source analysis. I will also be looking at census data to gauge progress concerning desegregation. In order to evaluate the extent and various forms of segregation in post-apartheid South Africa, I will first be analyzing post-apartheid policy to see where it has succeeded and where it has failed. The paper will focus on how specific policies have led to a continuation or reinforcement of segregation within urban areas and how government policy has dealt with the issue of land reform in rural areas. The paper will then look at instances in which desegregation *is* occurring and will evaluate the factors that are involved. Finally, I will be drawing upon a range of sociological theories in order to support my theory that there is a new form of segregation in post-apartheid South Africa.

Developments in Post-Apartheid Policy

In post-apartheid policy making, there seems to be a real striving toward change. However, social scientists have been researching the relationship between idealism and reality in policy making. Jansen's theory of "political symbolism" looks at "the policy-practice gap [of the post-apartheid government] through the lens of political symbolism, arguing that impressive policies of the post apartheid state may not have implementation as their primary purpose" (Lemon 2005: 72) . Jansen's assertion is supported by the fact that when the government announces new policies, it often fails to provide any indication of how these impressive-sounding policies will actually be implemented. The government's reliance on political symbolism results from the following four factors:

an unfavourable macro-environment which left the state no alternative but to stress the symbolic value of policy; imperatives of reconciliation in the immediate post-apartheid period; the constitutional division between central responsibility for educational 'norms and standards' and provincial responsibility for

implementation; and a new governing elite, historically conditioned to rely on symbolic politics during the liberation struggle. (72)

Although Lemon (2005) breaks down Jansen's theory of political symbolism and applies it to education policy in the above quote, the analysis can be applied to post-apartheid policy as a whole. There are simply not enough resources to complete what needs to be done. There are also not enough administrators to promote changes indicated by policy. Therefore, the government relies on symbolism—of a new country with greater opportunities, of racial equality, of desegregation—to pacify the public. In reality, the goals of state policy are less grounded in reality than in a dream for an ideal new society.

Continued segregation

Residential desegregation is occurring in areas of South Africa's urban centers. However, many of the republic's rural areas and townships outside of cities are still very much segregated. Reasons include a lack of strong policy regarding housing and land redistribution and an over-reliance on economic processes to desegregate society. Desegregating majority white areas has been the main focus in post-apartheid politics because these are the areas from which blacks and other minority groups were removed. Compensating individuals for the historic trauma of this removal is an understandable priority for a government that wants to be seen as supporting justice and redressing the apartheid government's crimes against humanity.

Since 1991, when the main legislation for apartheid was repealed, South Africa's housing system has attempted to promote greater social and physical desegregation. However, in some ways, legislation has actually reinforced patterns of segregation. In 1994, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) was formed by the government of national unity (led by African National Congress). One of the RDP's goals was to reintegrate South African cities. That same

year, the Independent Development Trust (IDT), the capital system in South Africa first introduced in 1990, became the central instrument in the government's housing subsidy scheme; this system is still used to this day (Huchzermeyer 2005: 214). This policy was developed to assist poorer populations in gaining access to the formal housing market by granting monetary subsidies to individuals (Christopher 2003). The government provided a R15, 000 (about \$2,000) subsidy to individuals attempting to become homeowners (Parnell & Hart 1999: 384). There were 1,129,612 cheap houses constructed between 1994 and 2000 that were eligible for government subsidy. These houses were received by five million out of an estimated 12.5 million people who were without proper housing, revealing substantial progress if not complete success (Lodge 2003: 57).

Unfortunately, when examined more closely, these subsidies often reinforce segregation.

Huchzermeyer (2005) highlights the reasons why in the following explanation:

The project-linked capital subsidy may also be seen to preserve high-income housing markets by directing low-income development onto cheap tracts of land on the urban periphery. Furthermore, the high level of production has served to reduce demands by community-based organizations for more appropriate urban development. (215)

Due to a massive shortage of urban land for new housing, these subsidized houses have been constructed around the periphery of preexisting townships (Christopher 2006: 2306). The location of these subsidized houses prevents many residents from finding jobs close by because there are not as many job opportunities within townships. If they are able to find a job, residents must pay for transportation that many cannot afford. Also, the very low subsidy provided by the government (about 2,000 U.S. dollars) does not help people purchase houses in more desirable areas. For that, one would need a much higher subsidy.

The role of the South African economy in the process of desegregation is a large one. In 1996 there was a major shift toward a market-centered strategy. The government adopted a neoliberal free-market policy called the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. In doing this, the ANC had to shift the majority of the economic decision making for the country from themselves to the market in exchange for loans. The ANC “accepted the principles of neoliberal economics, which maintain that public debt jeopardizes economic growth, that poverty is solved by growth and growth results from giving capital incentives to invest” in the hopes that the economy would be stimulated (Macdonald 2006: 143). Unfortunately, GEAR has not been as successful as the government had hoped. It has not provided enough job growth (especially for the black population), economic growth, or loans to the government and according to Christopher (2005) GEAR has “effectively ended any attempt to implement far-reaching state-funded schemes to undo the *apartheid* city” (2306). Since the great majority of black South Africans are extremely poor, most are actually unable to purchase property in formerly white areas even if they are legally able to do so. Therefore, white populations are able to maintain a great deal of ‘their’ territory in urban areas (Christopher 2001: 454). Market forces obviously favor the white population. According to Piper (2001) there has been no “coherent and substantial national policy to direct urban residential desegregation nor, for that matter, broader patterns of migration” (97). By placing such a high level of responsibility for desegregation on market forces, segregation is often reinforced. Poor blacks will not be able to leave their communities without a greater level of involvement from the state government.

Another factor that has contributed to continued segregation in townships and other areas with mono-ethnic populations is that of class. Most of the inhabitants of the townships and homelands are extremely impoverished and/or unemployed. The townships and homelands have

few economic or cultural resources to offer inhabitants. Therefore, whites are not moving into majority black areas, and middle-class blacks are leaving these areas if they can afford to. Negative perceptions of the lower class promote views of those living in townships as deviant. Charles (2003) discusses how these perceptions lead to social isolation of poor blacks. “It is the collection of undesirable social class characteristics associated with blacks or the neighborhoods where they are concentrated—joblessness, welfare dependence, proclivity to criminal behavior—not race per se, that motivates aversion to black neighbors, not only among out-groups, but among blacks themselves” (182). While desegregation is occurring in previously all-white urban communities, no one is willing to move into townships or neighborhoods where there is a majority black population. Blacks who can afford to are motivated to move into previously all-white areas. When upwardly mobile blacks leave traditionally all-black areas, other population groups do not move in because of the multiple negative associations (as seen in the above quote) majority black neighborhoods have attached to them. In Soweto, South Africa’s largest black township with about 1.2 million residents, there are probably no more than twenty white, colored, and Indian residents (Morris 1998: 764). Those who argue that South Africa is making progress in residential desegregation fail to acknowledge racially segregated townships. When middle-class blacks move out of these areas, townships lose many of their most promising and skilled inhabitants while unskilled and “deviant” populations remain, creating the possibility of a permanent underclass.

Townships were created when segregationary legislation was instituted. Although population groups did not initially choose to live in these areas, the townships eventually became home over time. Therefore, even though legislation has been repealed, some township residents may not wish to leave. All-black townships may not be problematic in themselves; however, all-

black townships from which middle-class blacks have fled will offer fewer and fewer opportunities to those who remain. Those middle-class African families who wish to leave townships do so for reasons such as deteriorating school levels and an increase in crime. Morris (1998) posits: “It is a distinct possibility that over the next decade many black township neighborhoods could lose their multiclass character and become populated mainly by marginalized, poor black households that are largely dependent on illicit activity for survival” (765). Residents who do not wish to or cannot leave townships will then be penalized by the loss of a multiclass population.

Land reform in rural areas

Segregation in rural areas has a different history and meaning than segregation in urban areas. Segregation in rural areas in some cases preceded any apartheid legislation. To understand land reform in rural areas, it is important to examine the history and meaning of segregation in these areas. Some of the inhabitants of the homelands were relocated from urban centers, and others were relocated from other rural areas (See Table 1). Whereas some rural black South Africans already lived in the areas that became one of the ten homelands during apartheid, others lived in and farmed in other parts of the South African rural landscape. Before apartheid, whites moved into areas with fertile farmlands, where they coexisted with the black population. Historical research has shown that before apartheid, black farmers were commercially successful. After apartheid was imposed, black farmers were removed from their agriculturally valuable lands and placed in one of the ten homelands. The homelands had less fertile land and were smaller in terms of area, preventing black farmers from competing with white farmers (Lodge 2003; Deegan 2001).

Today, post-apartheid, land reform has been a key program of rural development in South Africa. The emphasis on land reform is partially to compensate for actions made in the past. Land reform is also important because South Africa has the most unequal land distribution in terms of race within the continent of Africa. According to a 1996 census, 18.8 million South Africans lived in the countryside, 14 million of whom were living in former ethnic homelands. The majority of those living in the homelands were extremely poor and living on R237 a month per household (about \$32). The former homelands represent 25% of the countryside with farming potential. The other 75% of countryside with agricultural potential was owned by 60,000 farmers who were mostly white.

Unequal land distribution is not necessarily an economic or social issue by itself. However, in South Africa, it has become a problem because “this inequality is associated with a recent history of dispossession and enforced resettlement, racial barriers on ownership until 1991, and acute overcrowding within the boundaries of the former homelands” (Lodge 2003: 70). This imbalance of land ownership is a serious issue that the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) felt the need to address beginning in 1991. The RDP is a government program that is self-described as “an integrated socio-economic framework aimed at building a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist community” (Deegan 2001). In 1994, the government committed to the following three types of land reform: redistribution, restitution, and land tenure within and outside the former homelands. Redistribution is the transferring of white-owned commercial land to African users. Under redistribution, individual non-white households or groups of families are provided with grants to assist them in buying land from whites willing to sell. Restitution land reform was created as a policy under which people could place a claim that the state had “dispossessed them of land as a consequence of racial discrimination” (Lodge

2003: 82). If the claim was validated in what is called a Land Claims Court, the individual could get the original land back or receive monetary compensation. Land tenure is a policy geared towards labor tenants, those who work on a property owned by someone else. A registration system was created so that labor tenants who worked on commercially-owned farms could register ownership rights for the land they used for their personal plots, giving poor agricultural workers permanent rights to occupy some land. Of these three types of reform, the government has placed an emphasis on redistribution. The Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act of 1993 and the Development Facilitation Act of 1995 are two pieces of legislation that have provided land and also financial support to those receiving land. There has been some success with the government's redistribution goal, with 52,000 households receiving land by the end of 1999. However, due to understaffing, most of the money initially allocated toward this goal has not been spent. By 1997, a mere R20 million of a R314 million budget had been spent. This has led to a reduction in funding. As a result of understaffing and funding reduction, The Settlement Land Acquisition Grant program was suspended in 2000. The RDP announced a new way to redistribute land in February of 2000. This new policy's main focus was on the farming sector and was less "welfarist" and more "productionist" in its approach. The goal was to create 70,000 commercial farmers within fifteen years that would be settled on agricultural land bought by the government that would then become state-owned. However, this policy too has lacked a great degree of success due to a slow rate of land transfer to the government (Lodge 2006: 75-83).

Despite the difficulty of finding an effective and affordable program of land redistribution, the RDP remains committed to the overall goal of helping black South Africans in the homelands. When land redistribution is successful, it can "reduce social inequality, alleviate poverty and promote growth....[It can also] contribute to political stability if the transfer breaks

up racial monopolies in agriculture” (Lodge 2006: 84). Increased awareness of rural inequity and focus on making better policy would not only help redistribute land but also increase the economic status of those living in the homelands. Land reform within rural areas is possible. Unlike desegregation in cities, rural land redistribution places less emphasis on social integration between racial groups and more on creating a more equal playing field in the agricultural sphere for non-white South Africans. Black South Africans who live in rural areas may not be seeking integration. Integration may not be the only solution when it comes to opening up job opportunities. When the government redistributes land, black populations may still be physically segregated from whites. However, through land redistribution, black communities can apply for arable land formerly owned by whites that will increase their equity. This would be an instance where the creation of separate but equal communities would redress inequalities of the past.

Areas Experiencing Desegregation

Since the end of apartheid, there has been progress in the desegregation of South Africa. As previously stated, desegregation has in large measure been concerned with the return of previously excluded groups to the former white areas from which ethnic groups were removed during apartheid (Christopher 2001). Black South Africans, coloureds and Asians have begun moving into majority white urban areas, while a certain portion of the white population is moving out, chiefly into new suburbs. The continuing process of suburbanization, which has resulted from the mobility of the white population, has given other groups an opportunity to settle former white areas (Christopher 2005: 2307).

An increase in the socioeconomic status of some blacks has allowed them to leave majority black areas for urban centers. There has been a rise in household income for many

Africans (which is an indicator for relocation) (Macdonald 2006, 135). However, income rates are still very racialized. Table 3 shows income rates from 1994 of different races and gender in comparison to white male income rates. Although this data is a little dated, it is a strong indicator of the racialized nature of income.

Table 3. Income ratios by race, gender and education as a percentage of income of white men with similar education, 1994

Level of Education	Black women	Black men	White women	White men
Standard 5-6 (elementary)	10	25	75	100
Standard 7-8 (elementary)	10	10	40	100
Standard 9-10 (matriculation level)	5	20	40	100
Diploma	35	45	55	100
Degree	n/a	65	45	100

Source: Deegan (2001). SARDC 1997: 25.

The disparity between incomes based on race for those with similar education levels is an indicator as to why many Africans cannot move into majority-white areas. While there has been a degree of desegregation within urban areas, the high cost of housing in these areas is often a deterrent to integration. The urban land restitution program (a program developed in 2001 with the goal of reintegrating communities that were multiracial before apartheid) should lead to further desegregation of urban neighborhoods. However, since this program has only recently begun to take effect, there is not yet any definitive data on its success (Christopher 2005: 2307).

The “New Segregation”

While there has been progress in residential desegregation in South Africa's urban centers, there is a great deal of skepticism as to whether there will be complete success within these areas any time soon. The following quote suggests why:

The possibility of the city post-apartheid becoming a post-apartheid city—that is, deracialized, less polarized, socially cohesive, safe, and with all segments of the population having access to adequate shelter and infrastructure—is not strong. Most people will continue to live in uniraical neighborhoods that are in line with their apartheid racial category for the foreseeable future. As illustrated, the only neighborhoods that are deracializing to any significant extent are the historically white working-class and middle-class suburbs. (Morris 1998: 770)

2001 census data confirms this statement. Cape Town has been the city in South Africa that has made the most progress toward becoming desegregated. 2001 census data revealed that 48% of the 2.9 million population are coloured, 31.5% are black Africans, 19% are white, and Indian/Asians are a mere 1.5% of the population. However, census data for Cape Town's 683 suburbs reveals physical isolation of population groups within this supposedly desegregated city. Only 17 suburbs (2.5%) showed physical desegregation—revealing the polarization of race in Cape Town (Lemanski 2006, 569). This data on a specific city is indicative of what is occurring among South African urban centers as a whole. Within desegregated cities there can be physically segregated communities. Morris (1998) claims racial segregation and inequality are still “primary features” of urban areas and that, “All South African cities continue to be overwhelmed by their apartheid history” (764).

In South Africa, even if communities and neighborhoods become residentially desegregated, research has shown that there is a strong lack of social integration between population groups. Although a suburb or neighborhood may be technically desegregated (defined by census data as having a population that has no more than 50% of one racial group and at least 25% of another), there are now patterns of social segregation within such areas (Lemanski 2006:

564). One explanation for the continuing lack of social integration within these areas is the “paradox of contact” theory. The theory warns that “intergroup contact in which behavior follows the traditional norms of super-subordination and/or social distance will, on the whole, perpetuate and reinforce patterns of prejudice and discrimination” (Williams 1964: 221-2 as cited in Durrheim & Dixon 2005). By looking at the paradox of contact theory, one can see that prejudice can actually occur *because* of contact between racial groups. This prejudice explains the continuation of social segregation.

I suggest that the lack of social integration within residentially desegregated areas, an issue that is raised in previous literature, should be identified and labeled as a key concept related to segregation in South Africa. For the purposes of this paper, I have named this trend the “new segregation” of South Africa. This trend is significantly affecting South Africa’s efforts to create a functionally unified multiracial society. Without taking this new segregation into account, both the state and the public risk overestimating the degree of contact racial groups are experiencing in desegregated areas of South Africa.

Scottsburgh beach study

An observational study conducted by Durrheim and Dixon (2005) provides a snapshot of the “new segregation” in South Africa. Durrheim and Dixon conducted a study at a public beach called Scottsburgh in order to observe intergroup processes. Beaches are public and do not contain any physical structures or systems of management, therefore allowing for “freedom of assembly, association, movement and expression” (43). The researchers estimated that over their period of observation, the sample was estimated as being 64% black, 24% white, 10% Indian, and 2% coloured. Researchers observed different forms of contact on the beach including people

interacting near the swimming pool, walking along the beach, sitting under umbrellas, and talking. The majority of contact events (73%) ended up taking the form of simple conversation. Durrheim and Dixon noted that groups that were interacting were fairly mixed regarding sex and age (30.4% of interactions were all women, 29% = all men, and 40.6% = mixed; 55.7% of interactions between adults, 24.9% = adults and children, and 19.5% = children only). The fact that all interactions were fairly mixed concerning these variables highlights the following finding even more. Durrheim and Dixon found that out of 503 observed contact events, a mere 12 (3.4%) were mixed-race interactions. The racial compositions of the groups interacting were as follows: 212 groups interacting (42.1%) were all white; 215 (42.7%) were all black; 54 (10.7%) were all Indian and 10 (1.7%) were all coloured (46). The results of the study reveal the extent of social isolation in the post-apartheid era.

I further theorize that the racial composition of neighborhoods surrounding beaches may dictate the racial composition of visitors. This theory was developed through my (strictly non-academic) observations at public beaches during my time in Cape Town. Public beaches in affluent white areas (specifically at Camps Bay, a well-known tourist area near Cape Town with a strip of restaurants running adjacent to the beach) were frequented by a white majority public. During my weekly visits to the beach at Camps Bay, I observed very few black people on this beach, and most of them were selling wares or begging. At beaches in areas that were more racially mixed residentially such as Muizenberg, I observed a more racially diverse beach-going population similar to the Durrheim and Dixon sample. The high degree of racial isolation within a publically desegregated sphere as seen in Durrheim and Dixon's Scottburgh beach study is concerning. The study's results further support the concept of a "new segregation" in South Africa.

Role of schools

South African public schools are a source of social separation between racial groups within residentially desegregated areas. Children are born without prejudice and a mixed-race school environment would be a way to cultivate racial tolerance (although there is always the possibility that the paradox of intergroup contact could occur) (Durrheim & Dixon 2005). Unfortunately, since apartheid ended and public schools became integrated, there has been a trend among white South Africans to remove their children from public schools and place them in private ones. This is due to negative opinions of other racial groups. Social segregation is then reinforced because most non-white population groups cannot afford private school tuition.

Lemanski (2006) gathered qualitative data on parents' perceptions of local schools in a case study of Muizenberg, a previously all-white suburb near Cape Town. The following excerpts reveal negative perceptions that will be hard to overcome:

[We removed our daughter from MJS and] sent her to Fish Hoek middle school...because it's whiter—and we thought she'd feel more at home. She was battling at MJS because it was so coloured and she felt excluded, so at Fish Hoek she was able to assert her identity (P.H., 28 September 2004).

[My kids are at...St. James [primary school. Why not MJS?] I was concerned sending my eldest to a school with kids from Cape Flats [a former coloured group area]. He's very sensitive and I didn't want him with rough and tumble kids from Lavender Hill [a coloured area notorious for gangsters] (C.A., 1 December 2004). (Lemanski 2006: 574).

The results of Lemanski's interviews highlight the point that perceptions of public schools need to change. Note the language the first parent uses when describing her (white) daughter. At the public school, the girl "felt excluded." She had to go to a white school in order to "assert her identity." This language not only places the white student as a victim; it emphasizes a racial line that cannot be crossed. Judging by the strong language used by the interviewee, the parent is not comfortable being in close contact with other racial groups. By

being placed in an all-white school, the daughter will not be able to form her own opinion of the “other” and will most likely mold her beliefs and perceptions to match those of her parents. The second quote highlights a more overtly racist attitude. The white son is “sensitive” while his peers are “rough and tumble kids.” These attitudes are strong and reflect negative stereotypes of non-white South Africans. In the United States, according to Timberlake (2000) “negative racial stereotypes and perceptions of group threat from blacks are the strongest predictors of whites’ resistance to integration” (as cited in Charles 2003: 185). This claim is based on analysis of data on race relations in Atlanta. This claim can be used to illustrate the reasons for the parents’ removal of their white children from public school in Muizenberg. The parents’ responses can be coded for both racial stereotyping and perceptions of group threat. Without ongoing and substantial contact, groups cannot develop new views of each other that could lead to more positive interactions and perceptions.

Not only is education a way to create more balance in terms of opportunity, it would also be a way to promote positive relations between racial groups (Durrheim & Dixon 2005). When Lemanski (2006) observed a pre-primary school in Muizenberg that was significantly racially mixed and whose students were all from Muizenberg she discovered that, “In this case at least, educational institutions appear to be facilitating integration between parents and children of different races, as well as integrating families into a local community” (580). This finding reveals that contact *can* affect race relations positively. Without contact between groups, negative opinions of the “other” will continue to hamper the state’s goal of social integration.

White flight

The parental removal of white students from public schools that have become desegregated is one example of “white flight”. Once there is a certain proportion (“critical mass”) of black South Africans who have moved into a ‘white’ suburb, the white population begins to experience a great deal of discomfort. When this discomfort leads to a mass exodus of the original population, it is called “white flight” (Lemanski 2006: 575). In an American context, Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) observe: “For blacks, Latinos, and Asians economic and social advancement is associated with greater proximity and similarity to white Americans. For whites, integration, especially with blacks, brings the threat of a loss of white relative status advantages” (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996: 904 as cited in Durrheim & Dixon 159). This observation can be applied to South Africa and provides an insight to why white flight occurs. Morris (1998) looks at this phenomenon occurring in areas of Johannesburg. “Unfortunately, white flight has led to an almost complete racial transformation of some innercity neighborhoods in Johannesburg so that they have once more become ultimately uniraical, albeit with a different racial category than the one that resided there previously” (764). We can see that a movement from residential segregation towards integration can ultimately lead to a new kind of segregation, with formerly all-white neighborhoods becoming majority black neighborhoods, as whites refuse to remain and engage with their new neighbors. The white flight theory is one more example of how desegregation can actually result in the reinforcement of segregation.

The principle-implementation gap

The “principle-implementation gap” is a theory that examines the gap between attitudes and behavior (Durrheim & Dixon 2005). It may also help to explain the phenomenon of white flight. The Morris (1999) study looked at changing race relations in an inner city area of Johannesburg. Results showed that there were “contradictions between the liberal shift in race

attitudes of white residents and the fact that ‘a significant proportion of these same respondents resent[ed] the movement of black residents into the neighborhood’” (Durrheim & Dixon 2005: 98). These theories explain the discrepancy between social attitudes and behavior and reveal how “new” segregation (or failure of social integration) can occur within desegregated areas. While some whites who flee are openly and consistently racist, even whites with ostensibly liberal attitudes can exhibit the same behavior.

Spatial assimilation theory

While I believe that this lack of interaction between racial groups is mostly negative (hence my desire to name it the “new segregation”), there are ways in which it is a positive. “Spatial assimilation” is a theory that is the dominant United States model concerning the analysis of minority residential segregation, especially immigrant groups. It argues that, “...newly arrived migrants tend to locate in the vicinity of their compatriots in central cities for reasons of affordability of housing opportunities and processes of ‘bonding’” (Bergers & van der Lugt 2006: 128). Although black South Africans are not immigrants, I argue that this theory can be applied to them. Black South Africans were removed from their homes during apartheid and subsequently relocated to specific geographic locations. Townships eventually became “home” to the black population and a new identity was created, complete with social norms and practices that were quite different from those in the rest of South Africa. Therefore, after apartheid, the blacks who relocated back to majority white areas could be comparable on a certain level to immigrants. Both groups have left their land and home to enter a society markedly different from what they know. It is much easier to navigate the norms and practices of this new ‘alien’ society when one has the support of others who identify with one’s own cultural background.

Immigrants, or black South Africans within the context of urban South Africa, gravitate toward each other to seek comfort, economic stability, and understanding.

Within this particular context, social isolation from other population groups is occurring but not necessarily in a harmful way. For example, in an isolated case study of a South African suburb, Lemanski (2006) found that individuals who moved to Muizenberg (a traditionally white coastal town located near Cape Town) came for reasons which differed based on their ethnicity. Lemanski divides Muizenberg into three spatial zones, two of which house the majority of whites and coloureds. The majority of black South Africans living in Muizenberg resides in the downtown “village” area. Lemanski found that whites and coloureds were attracted to Muizenberg because of its physical beauty and location on the ocean, whereas black Africans and immigrants were attracted to Muizenberg for “more personal reasons such as work/studies, having friends in the area, feeling safe and being able to afford accommodation” (572). In this case, black South Africans are moving into an area where they can live in mono-ethnic enclaves within a desegregated town. Blacks achieve agency by choosing to live in the vicinity of other black South Africans. In this case, then, it would not seem appropriate to look at this through the lens of the “new segregation” which implies a lack of agency.

The danger of the spatial assimilation theory is that it can be used to justify a government’s failure to intervene and rectify social injustice resulting from a lack of integration. In the United States the assimilation model has become popular because it allows the public sphere to justify social segregation. The hegemonic population can claim that minority groups are choosing to separate themselves from the popular culture. This theory can be applied specifically to post-apartheid South Africa, where, according to some, minority groups “are unwilling to obtain the necessary skills to qualify for the labour market and deliberately seek

each other's company in certain urban districts and neighborhoods where they create subcultures of deviance, informal economic activities, crime and religious fundamentalism—in sum: they do not want to be like 'us'" (Burgers & van der Lugt 2006: 129-30). Without greater political intervention, population groups (specifically black South Africans), will continue to be "othered" by white South Africans as in the quote above.

Place stratification theory

The "place stratification" theory is often discussed in connection with the spatial assimilation theory. The place stratification model differs from the spatial assimilation model in terms of the factors identified as accounting for high segregation levels. Within the United States context, this place stratification model "explains lagging black suburbanization in terms of cultural prejudice of white population groups and downright discrimination by real estate agents, mortgage providers and local authorities" (South & Crowder, 1997: 526 cited in Burgers & van der Lugt 128). The spatial assimilation theory places responsibility on the subjugated group for causing segregation within desegregated areas. Contrastingly, the place stratification theory looks at outside forces as the reason for segregation. The pattern of movement of some whites in majority white areas once other population groups enter supports the place stratification theory. Whites have a cultural prejudice against blacks and therefore leave the areas where physical integration is occurring. In some instances, there has been "a conscious move to preserve residential exclusivity through the establishment of gated suburbs and housing complexes" (Christopher 2005: 2307). White populations within South African cities cannot prevent immigration of other population groups, but they can leave themselves. This pattern of movement reinforces group segregation.

South African policy has stated that social integration is a priority. However, the government actually shows little involvement in promoting social integration. Policy assumes that physical segregation will lead to social integration. “This assumption is certainly prevalent in contemporary South Africa where the government is promoting both social integration and physical desegregation as of post-apartheid transformation. However, social integration is hampered by the absence of policies guaranteeing this goal...” (Lemanski 2006: 565). The legal constraints of apartheid have been lifted but policy has not placed enough emphasis on integration. No population feels completely comfortable engaging socially with another group formerly designated as the “Other” just because a new political structure wishes them to. Desegregation may be occurring physically, but ethnic groups are still socially isolated from one another. This isolation further justifies the need to identify the lack of social integration as a “new segregation” in order to heighten political and public awareness. By acknowledging that physical desegregation does not inevitably lead to social integration, the government could establish new policies that would prevent the new segregation from taking hold.

Conclusion

In conducting a multiple source analysis, I have found that there are two forms of segregation occurring in post-apartheid South Africa. There is a lack of desegregation in rural areas and townships, leaving many blacks in these areas physically isolated from other racial groups. Then there are instances, chiefly in urban areas, where desegregation is occurring. However, within this pattern of desegregation there is a pattern of continued racial separation resulting from a lack in social integration between ethnic groups. I suggest that this be called the “new segregation” of South Africa. Although progress has been made since the restrictions of apartheid have been lifted, there needs to be more.

Policy must be rewritten not only to create more successful housing options and land distribution but to focus on social integration between races. Although policy cannot force individuals to interact, it can create venues in which potential interaction would occur and be successful. Schools are perfect places to develop positive relations. Children are not born with prejudice, but prejudice will develop without ongoing and intimate exposure to the “other”. As seen in the case study at Muizenberg, white parents can remove their children from public schools and place them in private schools that will be more racially homogeneous. If the government intervened by redistributing resources to create a more balanced education system and perhaps raising tuition of private schools, white parents might be induced to keep their children in public schools. Prolonged contact between population groups in a structured atmosphere such a school could lead to increased understanding and positive interactions.

Not all segregation has been a result of apartheid laws. Many communities in rural areas were racially segregated prior to apartheid. This reveals that not all segregation may be negative or has occurred without the agency of black South Africans. However, within rural areas, there is a major imbalance in land distribution between whites and blacks as a result of discriminatory practices. Past policy toward land reform has had some success, but not enough. The state government needs to place a stronger emphasis on land reform. This will lead to more self-sufficiency for the rural poor in the future and less reliance on state assistance. Land reform can result in increased food production for poverty-stricken rural populations, helping to reverse the residual effects of discrimination.

Although the United States and South Africa are very different, they have had similar issues within the context of racial residential segregation. By looking at the case of the United States, we can see that the process of desegregation and social integration is a long one. Racial

segregation is still an issue in the United States, despite the fact that many years have passed since blacks were given equal rights by the government. Although we can infer from this observation that progress in South Africa will be long and slow, there is no excuse for the government to be too passive in its approach to this issue. The South African government has a vital role to play in preventing new forms of racial isolation from escalating as well as continuing to address the past. In order to break away from the shackles of apartheid, the government must continuously adjust policy in order to keep up with a society in the midst of dramatic structural transformation. With each change comes much more change, and to successfully navigate the future, both the government and the people of South Africa need to focus on their ultimate goal: to become a truly successful multiracial society.

Bibliography:

- Beinart, William and Saul Dubow, eds. 1995. *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Bond, Patrick and Angela Tait. 1997. "The Failure of Housing Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa". *Urban Forum* 8: 19-41.
- Burgers, Jack and Hugo van der Lugt. 2006. "Spatial assimilation of minority groups: The case of suburbanizing Surinamese in the Rotterdam region." *Journal of Housing and the Environment* 21: 127-139.
- Butler, Jeffrey, Robert I. Rotberg, and John Adams. 1997. *The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and Kwa-Zulu*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Retrieved January 24 2010 (<http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft0489n6d5/>).
- Byrnes, Rita M. 1997. *South Africa: A Country Study*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Charles, Camille Zubrinsky. 2003. "The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation." *Annual Review Sociology* 29: 167-207.
- Christopher, A.J. 2005. "The Slow Pace of Desegregation in South African Cities, 1996-2001." *Urban Studies* 42: 2305-2320.
- Christopher, A.J. 2001. "Urban Segregation in Post-apartheid South Africa." *Urban Studies* 38: 449-466.
- Deegan, Heather. 2001. *The Politics of the New South Africa: Apartheid and After*. England: Pearson Education Ltd.
- Denton, Nancy A. and Douglas S. Massey. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Duckit, John and Thobi Mphuthing. 1998. "Political Power and Race Relations in South Africa: African Attitudes before and after the Transition." *Political Psychology* 19: 809-832.
- Durrheim, Kevin and John Dixon. 2005. *Racial Encounter: The Social Psychology of Contact and Desegregation*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Foster, Don. 2005. "Racialisation and the micro-ecology of contact." *South African Journal of Psychology* 35: 494-504.

- Goering, John, ed. 2007. *Fragile Rights within Cities: Government, Housing, and Fairness*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Huchzermeyer, Marie. 2005. "Housing Subsidies and Urban Segregation: A reflection on the Case of South Africa." Pp. 213-220 in *Desegregating the City: Ghettos, Enclaves, & Inequality*, edited by D.P Varady. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Lemanski, Charlotte L. 2006. "Desegregation and Integration as Linked or Distinct? Evidence from a Previously 'White' Suburb in Post-apartheid Cape Town." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 30: 564-586.
- Lemon, Anthony. 2005. "Shifting Geographies of Social Inclusion and Exclusion: Secondary Education in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa." *African Affairs* 104: 69-96.
- Lemon, Anthony, ed. 1991. *Homes Apart: South Africa's Segregated Cities*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Lodge, Tom. 2003. *Politics in South Africa (From Mandela to Mbeki)*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- MacDonald, Michael. 2006. *Why Race Matters in South Africa*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Morris, Alan. 1998. "Continuity or Rupture: The City, Post-apartheid." *Social Research* 65: 759-775.
- Parnell, Susan and Deborah Hart. 1999. "Self-help Housing as a Flexible Instrument of State Control in 20th-century South Africa." *Housing Studies* 14: 367-386.
- Piper, Laurence. 2005. "'They don't know who's who in the zoo': The ironic failure of state-managed racial desegregation in the government village of Oribi, Pietermaritzburg." *Society in Transition* 36: 97-112.
- Thornton, Robert and Rita M. Byrnes. 1997. "The Society and Its Environment." Pp. 87-166 in *South Africa: A Country Study*, edited by R.M. Byrnes. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Varady, David P., ed. 2005. *Desegregating the City: Ghettos, Enclaves, & Inequality*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Wassmer, Robert W. 2005. "An economic view of the causes as well as the costs and some of the benefits of urban spatial segregation." Pp. 158-174 in *Desegregating the City: Ghettos, Enclaves, & Inequality*, edited by D.P Varady. Albany: State University of New York Press.

